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The Congress of the United States, in an attempt
to reduce Department of Defense (DOD) spending, has
recommended an interservice consolidation of
Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training (UHPT) . DOD,
in the FY77 budget proposal, indicated its intention
to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The
proposal bases its cost savings, to a large degree, on
the elimination of the fixed-wing phase of Navy
helicopter pilot training and the "release" of an
unidentified Navy training base.
This thesis examines fixed-wing training as a part
of helicopter pilot training and the implied savings
attributed to consolidation as proposed. Alternatives
to the DOD proposal are also discussed in light of
their costs (both quantifiable and non-guantif iable)
,
their importance, and their impact on the training of
Navy and Marine Corps helicopter pilots.
The authors conclude, for a variety of reasons,
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INTRODUCTION
The Congress of the United States, in its attempt to
reduce spending by the Department of Defense, has solicited
a DOD proposal which provides for the combined training of
all helicopter pilots at Fort Rucker, Alabama. This
proposal assumes that trainees will participate in an
all-rotary-wing syllabus, the current Army format.
The Navy has historically trained all pilots in
fixed-wing aircraft prior to specialized training in
helicopters, jets, or multi-engine aircraft. The cost
savings cited by the DOD proposal are based, in part, on the
elimination of this fixed-wing training for helicopter
pilots. This thesis will examine fixed-wing training as a
part of helicopter pilot training as well as the suitability
of several alternatives to the DOD proposal, thsir costs,
importance, and impact on the training of Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Suard helicopter pilots.
Justification for each proposal rests upon such
non-guantifiable factors as personnel selection and
evaluation and trainee motivation, plus the more
quantifiable cost differentials of operating under varied
service training syllabi, using fixed-wing and helicopter
trainers. Each alternative will be evaluated on its ability
to meet the training requirements of the military services
leading to a day/night qualified, instrument-rated
helicopter pilot.






























* DOR* > SURFACE NAVY
(ALL COMMISSIONED OFFICERS)
-DROPPED ON REQUEST
Figure 1 - TRAINING FLOWCHART
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Figure 1 above illustrates the normal progression of a
Student Naval Aviator through the flight training syllabus.
College graduates, recruited for the Aviation Officer
Candidate course, are not commissioned until their fourth
week of Primary Flight Training. If these students are
dropped from training before receiving their commission,
either due to inaptitude or their own request (DOR) , they
revert back to civilian status with no obligated service.
All other officer students must serve out their first tour
of service as required by their commission. This is usually
accomplished with the surface ships of the Navy. Besides
introducing the student to the flight environment, Primary
Flight Training serves as a screening and selection process
for the three aviation specialties; jet, propeller-driven,
or helicopter aircraft. The validity of this selection




On December 17, 1969 the House/Senate Appropriations
Committee directed the Navy and Air Force to terminate those
segments of their helicopter pilot training involving
fixed-wing aircraft. This was to be accomplished by
December 31, 1970. The Committee further requested that the
Department of Defense consider the feasability of
consolidating Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training (UHPT)
of all services under Army direction. These Committee
recommendations have been the subject of a seven year
debate, still not resolved, involving the Congress, the
Department of Defense (DOD) , the General Accounting Office
(GAO) , and each U.S. military service.
The Air Force complied with the directive almost
immediately. In April 1970, DOD announced that the Army
would begin training Air Force helicopter pilots in October
of that year. Approximately 225 pilots would be trained
annually to man a fleet of 500 helicopters.
The Navy, however, was considerably more resistant to
change. At the time, Navy undergraduate helicopter training
was conducted at four sites in the Pensa^ola, Florida area:
Pensacola, Saufley, Whiting, and Ellyson Naval Air Stations.
In addition to their own personnel, the Navy trained Marine
Corps, Coast Guard, and foreign nationals, graduating over
737 helicopter pilots in 1969. Consolidation of training at
an Army site, disregarding service parochialism, would mean
a major restructuring of Naval training assets.
12

While the Navy did not refuse to terminate its
fixed-wing training for helicopter pilots, it resisted
change on the grounds that the current training in the T-34B
and T-28 fixed-wing aircraft was a substitute for, not a
supplement to, certain phases of the rotary wing syllabus.
Funds for purchase and support of additional Navy
helicopters, needed in an all-rotary- wing syllabus, were
simply not available. In addition, the Navy submitted
dollar figures to the House Committee showing that T-34 and
T-28 operating costs were actually lower than helicopter
operating costs.
To further reduce costs, however, the Navy modified its
rotary-wing training syllabus by eliminating the
carrier-landing phase in the T-28 aircraft. This reduced
the training syllabus time from 55 weeks to U5 weeks. An
all-rotary-wing program was planned for implementation as
fixed-wing assets became obsolete. These factors seemed to
satisfy the Committee, since they then indicated to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that further
reporting on this item would not be required.
On December 14, 1970, OSD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
resurfaced the issue with a recommendation that the Army
begin to train all Navy helicopter pilots. A plan for
implementation of this recommendation was to be formulated
by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
The Navy and Marine Corps, however, continued to
vigorously oppose consolidation. Additional cost figures
were submitted which showed that Army training would mean an
annual increase in per diem money alone of $3000 per
student. More subjective considerations were also noted,
such as separation of the student pilot from his parent
service during his developmental stages as an officer, with
13

a resulting lack of sea-service orientation. In addition,
the Marine Corps maintained that eliminating fixed-wing
training would severely restrict their aviators 1 career
pattern and thus his chances for advancement. It was felt
that such a move would have grave affects on their
recruitment of career motivated pilots. In July 1971, due
to the controversy and apparent need for more objective
study, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard deferred a
decision on consolidation until March 1972.
Before that decision could be made, however, GAO
responded to Congressional interest in the matter,
initiating a review of the potential for consolidating
undergraduate helicopter pilot training. Their findings
were published in May 1974 and form the basis for
Congressional/DOD support of the program. (1) In summary, the
report provided some support for the House recommendation
for the elimination of the fixed-wing portion of
undergraduate helicopter pilot training and movement toward
a consolidated all-helicopter program at one site.
In response, DOD stated that the GAO study, conducted
during 1972 and 1973, needed to be updated before any final
decision was made. To avoid duplication of effort, further
data gathering and cost analysis of the issue would be
conducted by the Interservice Training Review Organization
(ITRO) . This Board, composed of the training chiefs of the
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, had been tasked
with reviewing DOD training needs and reducing costs. In
October 1974, a Helicopter Training Subcommittee was formed,
from the ITRO Flying Committee to study the proposed
consolidation. Due to considerable pressure from Congress
and GAO to resolve the issue, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Brehm set a report target
date of March 1, 1975. Although all other ITRO studies had
been conducted on an additional duty basis, the Flying
14

Committee and Helicopter Subcommittee were placed on a full
time basis in order to meet the deadline.
The completed ITRO study analyzes three "packaged"
options for undergraduate helicopter pilot training, with
respect to cost factors, requirements, objectives, and
service policies, listing positive and negativa aspects.
(For a more detailed analysis of the ITRO study, see Chapter
V.) In March 1975, subsequent to an OSD review of both the
ITRO report and an analysis done by the Department of the
Navy, stating the Navy/Marine Corps position, a decision was
made within DOD to establish a joint service undergraduate
helicopter training program.
At this point, research indicates that opposition to
consolidation by the Navy and Marine Corps ground to a halt.
Since there seemed to be no other alternative, Army and Navy
training commands began to form contingency plans for
consolidation of undergraduate helicopter pilot training.
The DOD FY77 budget, submitted to Congress in January
1976, proposed an increase of $10.1 million for Army
training of Navy helicopter pilots. No funds were budgeted
for the continuation of Navy helicopter pilot training.
Some mention should be made, at this point, of" the legal
right of the Secretary of Defense to consolidate pilot
training within the military services. On December 10,
1974, the Aviation Manpower and Training Division (OP-59)
,
for the office of the Deputy Chief of Nazal Operations (Air
Warfare) , requested an opinion from the Judge Advocate
General as to whether sush consolidation would require an
amendment of section 5012(b) of title 10, Onited States
Code. This section, relating to the composition and
functions of the Navy, is taken from the National Security
Act of 1947, which details the authority of the Secretary of
15

Defense regarding various functions of DOD and its related
agencies.
The concluding paragraph of the Judge Advocate's
response, dated December 20, 1974, is quoted here in
summation.
Since the training of naval aviation personnel is
a function assigned to the Department of the Navy
under 10 O.S.C. 5012, it would appear that, if the
Secretary of Defense were to propose the
consolidation of the undergraduate-pilot-training
programs of the military services, a report,
setting forth that proposal would have to be made
to the Senate and House committees. Two questions
would then be posed to the committees: (a)
whether the proposed consolidation would affect a
"major combatant function, power, or duty" in
accordance with 10 a.S.C. 125(a) (1); ana (b)
whether the proposed consolidation would "tend to
impair the defense of the United States" in
accordance with 10 D.S.C. 125(a) (2). Decisions on
these questions, of course, are strictly within
the provinces of the two committees.
It would appear, therefore, that DOD was proceeding with
a plan for consolidation of training which still required
the approval of both Houses of Congress before it could be
implemented.
While the Navy and Marine Corps were prohibited from
openly opposing the DOD position, they were also required to
testify before Congressional Committees on Appropriations.
As the second session of the 94th Congress convened on
January 19, 1976, many Congressmen still were not convinced
that consolidation of helicopter pilot training would prove
beneficial. Navy cost savings estimates had never been as
large as those submitted by DOD. Navy and Marine Corps
arguments had forestalled consolidation for six years. A
DOD budget line item, treating consolidation of helicopter
pilot training as a fait acco mpli, would still have an
uphill fight in the Congress.
16

III. CURRENT AMX/EMX HELICOPTER TRAINING SYLLABI
A. NAVY HELICOPTER SYLLABOS
The current Navy primary helicopter training syllabus
includes 90 hours of flight time in the T-28 fixed-wing
aircraft, 30 hours flight time in the TH-57 helicopter, and
70 hours in the UH-1 helicopter. Although each new flight
student spends an average of 4.5 weeks at NAS Pensacola,
Florida, undergoing induction tests and military
indoctrination, all helicopter flight training has been
consolidated at NAS Whiting Field, located about 30 miles
from Pensacola, in Milton, Florida. The Navy, taking the
cost-saving initiative, has closed NAS Ellyson and NAS
Saufley Fields, two bases formerly used for primary
fixed-wing and helicopter training.
The T-28 aircraft is a dual seat, fully instrumented
fixed-wing airplane, powered by a single reciprocating
engine. During these first 90 hours of flight time, the
student becomes thoroughly familiar with the flying
environment and the operational capabilities of the
aircraft. He practices instrument flying techniques, as
well as aerobatics, day/night visual and instrument flight
rule (VFR/IFR) navigation, and formation flying. The student
also acquires 8.4 hours of solo flight time, beginning after
completion of the familiarization stage.
In addition to flight time, the syllabus includes 31.2
hours of instrument flight training in the Navy's 2B21
17

flight simulator. The student also attends 132.6 hours of
classroom lectures, ranging from basic aerodynamics and
meteorology to discussions of flight techniques and
emergency procedures. Depending upon weather conditions and
student load, the T-28 syllabus runs an average of 21 weeks.
The Navy is currently in the process of introducing the
T-34C turbo-prop aircraft as a replacement for the aging
T-28. This fully instrumented fixed-wing trainer, purchased
at an estimated cost of $302,000 per aircraft, is scheduled
to begin operation early in 1977.
From this introductocy training in fixed-wing aircraft,
the student pilot proceeds to the TH-57 Bell Jet Ranger.
This aircraft is a light-weight, tandem seat helicopter
powered by a single turbo-jet engine. Although not equipped
for instrument flight, the TH-57 is a relatively inexpensive
helicopter to operate, and allows the student to develop
basic rotary-wing flight motor skills. After this brief
familiarization phase, the student is prepared for
transition to more advanced training. This stage of
training takes approximately 5 weeks to complete and
includes 25.5 hours of classroom instruction.
The final stage of training is conducted in the UH-1
"Huey." This helicopter , while still single engine in the
training model, is larger than the TH-57, carries a crew of
three, and is fully instrumented for all-weather flight.
This portion of the syllabus has a minimum, optimum, and
maximum length of 7.2, 11.4, and 12.6 weeks respectively.
Besides practicing helicopter instrument procedures and
airways navigation in this stage, the student also becomes
familiar with Navy unique flight operations and tactics,
e.g., Search And Rescue (SAR) operations and shipboard
landing techniques. The 2B18 instrument flight simulator
18

provides 28 additional hours of instrument training.
Another 54.3 hours are devoted to classroom instruction.
Again, depending upon weather conditions and student
load, it takes 37-42 weeks for a Navy student helicopter
pilot to be designated a Naval Aviator under the current
training syllabus. This time includes an average 4.5 weeks
at NAS Pensacola in the "Environmental Indoctrination"
phase.
B. ARMY SYLLABUS
The Army currently trains helicopter pilots in an
all-rotary-wing syllabus conducted at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
Each student flies 85 hours in the TH-55 and 95 hours in the
UH- 1 , with an additional 20 hours spent in the 2B24
instrument flight simulator.
Although similar in design to the Navy's TH-57, the
TH-55 is an older model, powered by a reciprocating engine.
Like the TH-57, it has an extremely limited instrument
capability and is used to familiarize the student with the
flight environment and develop his motor skills in
rotary-wing flight. Although equipped with the Visual
Omnidirectional Range (VOR) instrument navigation system,
vice the Navy's Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system, the
UH-1 is essentially the same aircraft used by the Navy. The
Army student transitions to the UH-1 for the more advanced
instrument and tactical operations phases of training.
In addition to the 180 flight hours and 20 hours of
simulator time, the Army flight student attends
approximately 530 hours of classroom lectures and academic
study, covering all phases of the flight environment. The
19

Army syllabus is programmed to take approximately 32 weeks.
Figure 2 shows a summary and comparison of the current
syllabus used by each service. It should be noted that,
while the Army provides its students with more helicopter
time, they require less flight time overall than the Navy
syllabus. This is due, in part, to the superiority of the
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IV. THE GAO STUDY
On May, 1974, the General Accounting Office issued a
report to the Secretary of Defense on the "Need to Assess
Potential for Consolidating Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot
Training." The report was a result of a GAO review of the
undergraduate helicopter training conducted by the services.
The costs reported are in 1972 dollars. (1)
The GAO study, findings, conclusions, and resultant
report are widely used by various individuals to argue both
for and against the proposal of consolidation. Kay items of
the report are:
1. The review was made in 1972 and 1973 with
projections into 1976.
2. The decline in helicopter pilot training
requirements of both services from a 1969 high of
7,955 to a projected 1976 requirement of 1,752.
3. A projection of fifty-five percant utilization
of Fort Rucker in the 1976 time frame.
4. The storage of 555 excess TH-55A helicopters
by the Army in 1972, with an average remaining
useable service life of more than 10 years.
5. The T-34 and r-28 aircraft currently being
used by the Navy in Primary and Basic training
were nearing the end of their useful service life,
which began in the 1950s.
6. An estimated 93 of the 265 T-34C aircraft the
Navy was expected to purchase in the 1975-1977
time frame would be utilized for UHP Training
under the then current training syllabus.
7. Since Fort Rucker will be at 55 percent
utilization and consolidation will only bring this
to 73 percent, DOD should consider the
alternatives to combine all training at a single
site under a joint program using helicopters only
or to discontinue fixed-wing training for Navy UHP
in favor of all-helicopter training using some of
the excess TH-55 aircraft.
22

8. No specific cost savings from consolidation
were given.
Keeping these key points in mind, the remainder of the
discussion about the report will concern the implications of
the data contained in the SAO study.
A. WHY THE STUDY WAS MADE
A simple perusal of the paragraphs on page one of the
GAO report indicates that Congress is interested in reducing
the cost of defense and "in particular, in economies and
efficiencies obtainable through standardizing and
consolidating. .. the various helicopter pilot training
programs of the military services."
Greater economy and efficiency in the operations of the
military and other agencies of the government were, and
remain, viable and valid goals. Standardization of
operations and consolidation of duplicated effort are viable
and valid means of accomplishing economy and efficiency.
The GAO, however, was responding to the Congressional
request for substantiation of standardization and
consolidation as a viable means of obtaining increases in
economy and efficiency.
On July 29, 1976, four days prior to the debate on the
Senate floor, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed a letter
addressed to Senator Stennis requesting support for UHPT
consolidation. The letter stated that "The General
Accounting Office [had] also studied the issue and agrees
with the proposal for consolidation" (2,S13062), when in
fact, the GAO only recommended that consolidation be looked
23

at in the full light of all significant cost factors. As
the report stated:
Changes have occurred since FY1972 which will
affect future program cost. Also, the disposition
of fixed and variable costs of on-going programs
must be known before the cost of a consolidated
program can be determined. (1/9)
B. THE DECLINE IN TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
The projected training requirements for an expected
peacetime rate of 1752 pilots, servicewide, for 1976 was 22
percent of the 1969 rate of 7,955. Mors significantly, the
reduction to the anticipated rates for 1973 and 1974
indicated 23 percent and 20.5 percent utilization
respectively, of the total DOD capability. (3,H6086)
For the Army, the 1973/1974 rates were expected to be
17.9 percent and 15.4 percent of the 1969 output,
respectively. The expected Navy and Marine Corps reduction
in training rates, at the "worst-case" comparison of the
1968 rate and projected 1975 rate is 57.5 percent
utilization. After closing the Fort Walters, Texas,
training site, the Army was facing a utilization rate of
53.8 percent and 46.4 percent of the 2400 pilot capability
existing at Ft. Rucker in 1973 and 1974.
In addition to internal consolidation at Ft. Rucker, 565
TH-55A helicopters and an undisclosed number of UH-1 "HDEI"
helicopters, which were in excess to the needs of the Army,
were placed in storage. Individuals interviewed by the
writers estimated that UH-1 aircraft available exceeded by




The decline in training requirements and operational
levels of the services, particularly those of the Army,
created a situation which was projected to bring about
embarassingly low utilization of Fort Rucker unless some
action to correct or justify the projection took place. On
17 June, 1976, Congressman Edwards of Alabama reported, in
discussions concerning the "Department of Defense
Appropriation Bill, 1977" on the floor of the House, that
Fort Rucker was currently experiencing 29 percent
utilization with a rate of 700 students. (3,H6086)
For the Army, the "75 percent decline in undergraduate
training" was a projected 84 percent decline by 1974. The
same 1969 vs. 1974 comparison for the Navy indicated a
projected 30 percent reduction. Since existing Navy
facilities would be unable to accept the combined load of
all service facilities and since the Army utilization level
was so low, the obvious conclusion appeared to be to
consolidate at an Army site. This would provide the
capability for a larger student load if needed in the
future, while simultaneously increasing the utilization of
Fort Rucker and the "excess" Army aircraft. (1/8)
C. TH-55 HELICOPTER TO PRECLUDE T-34C
The Navy plans to continue its fixed-wing
training in its undergraduate program and to
purchase 93 new fixed-wing aircraft costing about
518 million. The Army has over 500 excess training
helicopters, some of which could be used in a
consolidated all-helicopter training program.
(1,1)
In spite of the obvious logic of the paragraph quoted
above, no mention was made of the incompatability of the
25

TH-55 aircraft and the Navy rotary-wing syllabus, nor the
incompatability of the TH-55 with the radio-navigation
required to support the Navy mission (TACAN) . A 1976 effort
to define the compatability of the TH-57 (Navy) helicopter
and the TH-55 (Army) helicopter, used in a combined training
situation, indicated that the TH-57' s turbine engine was
unacceptable to the Army maintenance system. Moreover, the
TH-55 could not be modified, at reasonable cost, to accept
the TACAN radio-navigation system. In its present
configuration, the TH-55 precludes even the most basic TACAN
air navigation training.
In commenting that Army and Navy training was alike
"except for one Navy instrument system which the Army does
not use," GAO recognized a shortcoming which is not
correctable and would be ignored. Consideration was not
given to the fact that the "one Navy instrument system"
(TACAN) is compatable with air navigation systems installed
worldwide and the only reliable radio navigation system
installed for aircraft use on ships of the fleet. Aside
from radar and voice communications it is the only system
providing a pilot with distance information to or from a
fixed point or a moving ship. One of the costs of
consolidated training, utilizing the TH-55 for 100 hours of
basic helicopter training, would be to preclude the
day-to-day, fligtit-to-f light training of Navy and Marine
pilots in their most important air navigation system.
The purchase of T-34C aircraft by the Navy was intended
to provide replacement for deteriorating, 20 year-old T-3UB
and T-28 aircraft, while simultaneously providing an
instrument training capability commensurate with the
missions of Naval Aviators. Although the GAO concluded that
the Army syllabus could be modified to provide the
additional instrument training required by the Navy and
26

Marine Corps, it did not state that this would be
accomplished at the expense of visual navigation training
which the Army mission requires.
D. NAVY FIXED-WING TRAINING
Chapter 1 of the GAO report also states that,
In UHP training the student learns basic flying
skills, such as airmanship, spatial orientation,
aerial discipline, and the relation of aircraft
instruments to aircraft attitudes and
position. (1,3)
It is in these particular areas, and at this particular
point in the training of pilots, that the Navy preference
for fixed-wing training is based. It is in this particular
area that the Long Range Pilot Training System (LRPTS)
,
discussed in Chapter V, provides the key to the successful
training and education of a Naval Aviator.
The fixed-wing basic training aircraft facilitates the
coordinated process of learning basic airmanship;
exploration of and respect for the aerodynamic limitations
of aircraft; exploration of and respect for spatial
orientation problems inherent in each individual pilot to
varying degrees of severity; the learning of aerial
discipline with regard to one's own actions, and with
respect to radio useage, airport traffic, and other airborne
aircraft; the use of basic navigation equipment; learning to
be vigilantly conscious of fuel consumption; the learning of
timing and coordination in control of an aircraft; the
learning of the affects of variable meteorological
conditions on the pilot and his aircraft; awareness of
relationships of aircraft instruments to aircraft attitudes
and positions, from maximum airspeed to stall speed and in
27

the extremes of vertical and inverted positions; and the
adoption of the habit of maintaining cognizance of the
nearest emergency landing area, and the location of the
home- field.
Navy and Marine Corps flight instructors as well as
civilian pilots seeking FAA certification as flight
instructors are required to learn the fundamentals of
teaching and learni ng, as well as their responsibilities
as instructors. They must also be thoroughly familiar with
basic and advanced aerodynamics, and the "Integrated Method
of Flight Instruction." For more information on this
concept, see Chapter 7, Section A-1.
1 • Transfer of Learning
The transferability of skills and knowledge is the
subject of much debate among each of the protagonists of the
consolidation program. Obviously, techniques peculiar to
helicopters are not learned in fixed-wing aircraft.
Techniques in the performance of specific maneuvers learned
in fixed-wing training may not be directly transferable to
rotary-wing aircraft, and certain maneuvers may not be
performed at all during rotary-wing training. Aerobatic
maneuvers taught in fixed-wing training are usually modified
or omitted from rotary-wing training. In both instances,
however, the purpose and intent of the maneuvers is not to
teach expertise in aerobatics, but to develop individual
motor-response coordination, and the ability to recognize
incipient inadvertant entry into certain areas of the flight
regime, including the application of quick and appropriate
corrective action. The design characteristics of a "flies
by itself" fixed-wing training aircraft is thought to enable
a more rapid shift of attention from "control" of the
machine to "use" of the machine and its equipment in a
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learning situation. For a more complete discussion of
student pilot "learning curves" in this context, see pages
25 to 29 in reference (4)
.
Proponents of fixed-wing training argue that
aerodynamics, navigation, instrument flight, spatial
orientation and the other basic flying skills are more
easily and economically learned in a fixed-wing training
aircraft. Specific areas of aerodynamics and spatial
orientation, applicable to both fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft, are only, learned and experienced in fixed-wing
aircraft. Some examples of these are stalls of the lifting
surface (wing) , and inadvertant uncontrollable flight
resulting in inverted or vertical aircraft attitudes. Some
aerodynamic principles which apply to both fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft may be experienced under controlled
conditions in fixed-wing operations and must be avoided in
rotary-wing operations.
Is there a necessity for fixed-wing training? It
would appear that there is not, though there are certain
factors in which the use of fixed-wing aircraft facilitates
helicopter pilot training. These factors include (1) those
previously discussed regarding learning and learning
transfer, (2) the integrated training system to be discussed
in Chapter V, and (3) the alternative costs of comparable
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, discussed in Chapter
VII.
E. AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS
Appendix A contains the conclusions and recommendation
of the GAO audit report. Unfortunately, ths audit was
conducted with primary emphasis on what could be done to
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save costs vice what is required to achieve the most
effectiveness for a given dollar value. The authors wonder
if the auditing personnel were willing to recommend a course
of action resulting in acceptably low and relatively poor
performance in the "less important" area of training quality
as a trade-off to achieve better utilization of Fort Rucker,
and to satisfy the long-term desires of Congress to see
complete consolidation of all military flight training.
Since there were so many TH-55 helicopters available
there was no reason to establish the validity of using them
in a consolidated program. The impact of the finding was
not evaluated in light of the effectiveness which might be
lost by reverting to this aircraft.
The cost of the Navy DHPT program could be reduced if
the Navy was required to abandon fixed-wing training,
abandon the concept of integrated instruction, and to use an
aircraft designed in the late 50s, incorporating a
reciprocating engine. Not a single paragraph or sentence in
the report acknowledges consideration of the impact of these
factors on the effectiveness of the Navy's training program,
and the longer-range costs thereof. Consideration of the
"down-the-line" impact of these factors on the quality of
aviator produced could significantly alter the estimated
value of the consolidation proposal.
The underlying attitude of the published report, and
possibly the attitude held in pursuing the directive to find
consolidation as the answer to desirable "economies and
efficiencies," is contained in the conclusions.
In OHP training, the student learns basic flying
skills, techniques, and procedures necessary to
qualify as a helicopter pilot. (Appendix A)
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If this is truly the purpose of UHPT, all the services could
save substantial amounts of time and money by recruiting
••helicopter pilot" trainees and subsidizing privately
operated flight schools, where these students would meet FAA
requirements for a "Commercial, Helicopter" rating. The
report fails to consider the overall objective of the
military mission-oriented syllabus. In a paper presented to
a conference of Internal Auditors, in June, 1976, John R".
Pawsett, Associate Director for Organizational Analysis,
U.S. Army Audit Agency, stated:
In general, the objective of the audit effort is
to cause significant improvements in significant
activities or functions. One of the worst
mistakes the auditor can make is to cause an
improvement in one function at the expense of
another more important function. This can happen
unless the auditor makes a concerted effort to
determine the relative priorities of the various
missions and activities included in the audit.
If Mr. Fawsett's advice is sound, and if the subject
GAO audit had been carried out under an enlarged scope, the
report may not have satisfied the "intent" of the audit as
it was defined in the original request, but may have
identified significant factors which suggest that
consolidation is not cost-effective or desirable.
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V. INTERSERVICE TRAINING REVIEW ORGANIZATION STUDY
The final report of the Interservice Training Review
Organization Helicopter Training Subcommittee was submitted
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) on March 1, 1975. (5) The study presented three
alternatives to the present training system, together with
an evaluation of mission impact and comparative costing
(discussed in Chapter VII) . The three alternatives are:
1. The Navy Long Range Pilot Training System (LRPTS)
2. The All-Helicopter Option
3. The Combined Training Option
A. LONG RANGE PILOT TRAINING SYSTEM (LRPTS)
The stated objective of the ITRO study was "to
investigate the feasibility, advantages/disadvantages,
incremental/decremental costing, and mission impact of
increased interservice undergraduate helicopter pilot and
mission impact of increased interservice UHPT."(5,1) Under
the LRPTS, however, the Navy would continue to train Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard students using an improved and
updated syllabus, currently being implemented. Army and Air
Force students would continue training with the Army at Fort
Rucker
.
Consideration of the LRPTS, therefore, is a departure
from that objective in that this option does not relate to
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interservice training. The study group felt r however, that
a complete comparison could only be made if every viable
option was considered. Since the LRPTS had been thoroughly
researched and planned over a five year period it was more
than a mere possibility and therefore merited study.
1 « Integrated Flight Training. System (IFT S)
The most significant aspect of the LRPTS is the
change in the training syllabus from a modular system to an
integrated method of flight instruction. Under the modular
system, students progressed through flight training in
blocked sequence. Typically this sequence began with a
familiarization phase, followed by aerobatics to build skill
and confidence. These phases were taught using visual
references outside the cockpit with limited or no use of the
flight instruments. Then the student moved into the basic
and advanced instrument stages in which he was totally
dependent on his cockpit instruments. Finally, the student
moved on to advanced instruction in the various tactics
phases.
The Navy found, hawever, that pilots do not split
their skills into such discrete blocks when flying today's
high performance aircraft.
The experienced aviator uses his instruments
continuously even during contact flight and
integrates sensory inputs from instruments and the
external environment to achieve optimum control of
the aircraft. (6,4)
Dividing the flight training into separate contact
and instrument phases placed the student in an artificial
learning environment with the added burden of mastering
completely different skills in each phase. For this reason,
a Navy Integrated Flight Training System (NIFTS) was
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developed. NIFTS teaches the student "to perform flight
manuevers both by outside visual references and solely by
reference to flight instruments from the first time each
manuever is introduced."
The Federal Aviation Administrarion (FAA) has used
integrated flight instruction since 1959. The objective of
this method is the formation of firm habit patterns of
constant observance of and reliance upon flight instruments
which is essential to the efficient and safe operation of
aircraft. (7,71)
The following is quoted from the FAA Flight
Instructors Handbook as further support of the system's
value:
The habit of monitoring instruments constantly is
difficult to develop after one has accustomed
himself to relying exclusively on outside
references for heading, altitude, airspeed, and
attitude information, a procedure which was
adequate in most older airplanes.
A student pilot who has been required to perform •
all normal flight manuevers by reference to
instruments, as well as by outside references,
will develop from the start the habit of
monitoring his own and the airplane's performance
continuously. This habit would be much more
difficult for him to develop after he has had
extensive piloting experience without it, as
veteran pilots who Begin formal training for an
instrument rating can readily testify.
During early experiments with the integrated
technique or primary flight instruction, it was
soon recognized that students trained in this
manner are much more precise in their flight
manuevers and operations. This applies equally to
all of their flight operations, not just when
flight by reference to instruments is required.
As the student becomes more proficient in
monitoring and correcting his own flight technique
by reference to flight instruments, the
performance he obtains from an airplane increases
noticeably. This is particularly true of modern,
high performance airplanes, which are responsive
to the use of correct operating airspeeds.
The use of integrated flight instruction provides
the student with the ability to control an
airplane in flight for limited periods under
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favorable circumstances if outside references are
cut off.
The application of outmoded instructional
procedures, or the preparation of student pilots
for obsolescent certification requirements is
inexcuseable. (7, 71-73)
Validation of the Navy system was conducted in 1973
in a 70 flight hour "Eagle Program" at Training Squadron Six
at NAS Whiting Field, Milton, Florida.
A marked improvement in student performance and a
reduction in time to train were documented and
reported to the Chief of Naval Operations. .. in
September 1 973. ... Students involved in that
program achieved levels of proficiency in 17 weeks
and 70 hours of flight time which were equivalent
to that achieved by normal students in 22 weeks
and 100 hours. (6,7)
Although no decision has yet been made on LRPTS, the
Navy has implemented NIFTS into its current flight training
syllabus. The first students are, at the time of this
writing, in the pre-helo fixed-wing stage of training and
will reach the helicopter segments in January-February 1977.
At that time NIFTS will be introduced in the helicopter
syllabus
.
Figure 3 outlines the proposed LRPTS syllabus. The
reader will note that 28 hours are allotted to simulated
flight training (SFTS) in the Pre-Helo stage, in a trainer
yet to be assigned. As mentioned earlier, the Navy plans to
update its fixed-wing training with the better equipped
T-3UC. A new cockpit trainer and flight instrument trainer
are being, developed by the Naval Training Analysis and
Evaluation Group (TAEG) in Orlando, Florida.
The Navy also suggested that a further improvement
and cost savings could be affected in the LRPTS syllabus by
replacing the 2B18 flight simulator with the more
sophisticated 2B24 modules used by the Army at Fort Rucker.
If Fort Rucker's facilities are indeed under utilized, as
35

proponents of consolidation have stated, such a transfer of
assets would have no affect on Army training. Two modules
would provide eight cockpit simulators, thus enabling the
Navy to reduce its OH-1 flight syllabus at an estimated
savings of one and one-half million dollars a year. A new
building would have to be built to house these modules at a























B. ALL- HELICOPTER OPTION
The All-Helicopter Option consolidates all training at
Fort Rucker, Alabama, using the Army's existing assets and
eliminating fixed-wing training for Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard students. The Primary Helicopter and Instrument
segments of the curreat Army syllabus are unchanged. The
Contact/Tactics phase has been reduced from 65 to 40 hours,
however, to provide 25 hours service- unique training in
individual service training requirements. This syllabus is
outlined in Figure 4.
Included in this option is a provision for fixed-wing
training of Navy and Marine Corps career officers at the
completion of their first tour of obligated service
(approximately five years after designation) . Approximately
40% of the Navy and 60% of the Marine Corps pilots were
forecast to remain on active duty beyond this point, hence
the term "career officer."
The follow-on fixed-wing training discussed here refers
to additional experience required by career officers. It
does not relate to the fixed-wing training currently given
to student helicopter pilots in that, at this time, rather
than facilitating their learning to fly, it supplements
their aviation qualifications. Fixed-wing training at this
career point enables the officer to compete with his aviator
contemporaries for a full range of career enhancing
assignments. The estimated number of students involved and
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By devoting 85 hours to training in the Army TH-55, the
All-Helicopter option does not provide primary training
under the integrated flight training concept discussed
earlier. The TH-55, like the Navy TH-57, lacks both the
instrument capability and the appropriate simulator required
in an integrated syllabus. The Navy LRPTS uses the TH-57
for only 30 hours training, primarily for familiarization
with rotary-wing flight. The majority of training, within
the LRPTS, is under the proven superior integrated concept
(90 hrs. T-34C, 70 hrs. UH-1, 56 hrs. SFTS)
.
C. COMBINED TRAINING OPTION
This option would merge helicopter pilot training at
Fort Rucker only during the advanced training stage. As
outlined in Figure 5 the Navy and Marine Corps student
helicopter pilots would first receive 65 hours in the T-34C
fixed-wing aircraft in the Pensacola area. Then they would
proceed to Fort Rucker for their primary helicopter
training, conducted by the relocated existing Navy squadron,
using the TH-57 aircraft and the existing Navy syllabus.
All services would join in the advanced stage,
consisting cf 20 hours simulator, 30 hours aircraft
instruments, and 40 hours of contact/tactics. This is
followed by a service-unique segment of 25 hours flight
training (USN/USMC combined) . The Advanced and Service
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*SIMULATED FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEM
Figure 5 - COMBINED TRAINING OPTION
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A list of "pros and cons" for each option was submitted
as an enclosure to the completed ITRO report and are listed
in Appendix B. The authors feel that, while most of those
listed are valid considerations, they can only be listed as
pros or cons from a particular point of view.
As an example, under the LRPTS option, CON argument #3
states: "Does not relieve Congressional/GAO pressure to
consolidate." This statement presupposes that
Congressional/GAO pressure is founded on a sound and logical
basis. More important, such a statement elevates "relief of
pressure" to the status of an objective of the option
analysis. Was the ITRO study done to find a way to placate
Congress? Should the LRPTS be discounted because it does
not fulfill such an objective? The inclusion of such
arguments in a "non-partisan" report detracts from the
credibility of the entire effort. Predetermined
suppositions and conclusions rarely illuminate the real
costs and benefits of the alternative considered. The
reader should therefore consider each argument on its own




VI. PROPOSED CONSOLIDATED SYLLABUS
Although the consolidation question was still being
debated in the FY77 budget hearings, DOD proceeded to plan
for implementation at the start of the new fiscal year on
October 1, 1976. Following DOD direction, Army and Mavy
representatives from the respective aviation training
commands began to work out the details of consolidating
undergraduate helicopter pilot training using the Ail
Helicopter Option as a guide.
Between May 10 and June 28, 1976, a group of Navy
Instructor/Standardization Pilots from Helicopter Training
Squadron Eighteen conducted an evaluation of the U.S. Army
Helicopter Training Syllabus at Fort Rucker. During the
evaluation they participated in the three phases of
Instructor Pilot Training and observed the Initial Entry
Student Training Flights. The following is quoted from
their evaluation report, dated July 9, 1976, concerning Army
Instructor Pilot Training:
Each Instructor Pilot (IP} Course is very
successful in developing a pilot well qualified to
fly the maneuvers associated with that particular
phase of helicopter aviation. The flight and
academic instruction received in each IP program
is directed towards developing a pilot well versed
in procedural knowledge, possessing a high level
of skill in maneuver performance. An area
warranting greater emphasis, however, is the
development of the pilot as a flight instructor.
The concept of error detection and correction, the
development of instructional techniques, and the
discussion of common student errors associated
with particular maneuvers should be introduced
into the Army program of instructor pilot
training. It must also be noted that a
significant percentage of the IP instructors have




The report also suggested certain modifications and
additions to the Initial Entry student syllabus in an
attempt to improve the consolidated training of all
services.
Subseguent to their report, a meeting was held between
Navy representatives from Training Air Wing Five, NAS
Whiting Field and the Army Department of Resident Training
Management, Fort Rucker, in order to formulate and resolve
any differences in the Initial Entry Flight Program.
The consolidated syllabus agreed upon is outlined in
Figure 6. As proposed, it consists of 175 flight hours,
using all rotary-wing aircraft, plus 40 hours of simulated
instrument training. The most significant changes to the
ITR0*s All-Helicopter Option are:
1.) TH-55 flight time was reduced from 85 hrs. to 50 hrs.
Although 50 hours is more in line with the Navy's views
on the usefulness of this aircraft (Navy's analysis of ITRO
says 30 hours max.), it still precludes use of the
Integrated Flight Training System. To be effective, the
integrated system must be used from the first time the
















































2.) The Navy-unique segaent was increased from 25 hours to
30 hours.
The service-unique phase was originally proposed to
provide training in operations and tactics peculiar to the
requirements of each service. As such, the Navy's portion
would provide familiarization with the shipboard flight
environment, search and rescue (SAR) , and operations and
navigation over water. Scheduling this type of training at
the end of the syllabus has some financial implications, as
discussed in Chapter VII.
It would seen howevec, that the Navy representatives
feel that more instrument training is needed at the expense
of these maritime operations. Twenty-six of the total
thirty hours are devoted to additional instrument flights.
Of this 26, however, only 1.5 hours are devoted to
Navy-unique TACAN instrument procedures. It also seems odd
that, in the Navy-unique phase, another 1.5 hours are
devoted to practicing 70R instrument navigation. The VOR
system is not installed oa any operational Navy helicopter.
In addition, 1.5 hours of shipboard operations in the
current Navy syllabus have been deleted from the program.
These two flights (.8 and .7 hours respectively) introduce
students to ship's communication, navigation aids, and
identification procedures, Charlie and Delta holding
patterns, visual landing signals, and over-water navigation,
as well as qualifying the student with five shipboard
landings.
In a Navy experiencing further reductions in operational
at-sea steaming time, qualifying a student in shipboard
landings while he is in the training command gives him a
valuable step-up when he gets to a fleet squadron. Few
ships have the time or the operating funds to give fleet
readiness squadrons unlimited helicopter landing practice.
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Consequently, pilots are qualified before a cruise on a
somewhat haphazard as-available basis. Any additional
shipboard flying experience would certainly be invaluable to
the novice aviator about to embark on his first operational
tour.
3.) 25 hours flight tine are devoted to familiarization
with the OH-1.
4.) Flight simulator time has been increased in the
combined Instrument stage, from 20 hrs. to 35 hrs. At the
same time, OH-1 flight time has been reduced, in this stage,
from 30 hrs. to 20 hrs.
This should cause no reduction in proficiency, since the
2B24 simulator has been shown to be an outstanding training
device, while operating at roughly one tenth the cost per
hour of the OH-1.
In order to implement this syllabus, 98 Naval officers
(84 instructors and 14 administrative personnel) , 85 Marine
Corps instructors, and 25 Navy enlisted personnel would be
permanently stationed at Fort Rucker. DOD sources also
indicate that 2300 DOD jobs, presumably in the Pensacola
area, will be cut if helicopter training is consolidated at
Fort Rucker.
Essentially, the proposed consolidated syllabus reverts
back to the same syllabus content used prior to 1971. Any
progress gained in instructional technique (NIFTS) and
training quality (maritime operations) during the past 6
years has been eliminated.
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VII. COST FAC£ORS in CONSOLIDATION
In introducing this chapter on the costs and savings
associated with the proposed consolidation, the authors feel
it is necessary to specifically advise the reader that the
costs reflected in the DOD justification, the ITRO study,
and the GAO study, are "end-costs" computed by
determining/estimating differentials from the status guo.
In some cases the estimates are made for conditions which
have never existed and with unspecified assumptions in mind.
The detailed accounting data necessary to substantiate the
costs put forth as fact were not provided with the cost
summaries. The reader of these summaries is left to assume
their validity.
In researching the material contained in the various
studies and statements put forth to substantiate the
arguments both for and against consolidation, several
obvious discrepancies become apparent.
1. Incremental-decremental costing, as
differentiated from a baseline level, is used
throughout, providing "added" costs and "savings"
for both the Army and the Navy.
2. Although the ITRO study delineates the basis
used in determining operating costs associated
with various aircraft, there is some doubt as to
the accuracy of these figures.
3. Aircraft operating costs are but a small part
of the $37 million per year "savings" projected in
the DOD figures.
4. Total costs and their basis of calculation
are not given for any comparative fiscal or
calendar period for either of the training
programs.
5. If these total cost breakdowns were provided,
accounting differences between the services would
probably be identifiable, while actual costs
experienced by the services due to differing or
equivalent program elements would be available for
comparison. The Navy currently appears reluctant
to provide full-cost data under a "cost-averaging"
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accounting system due to the feeling that the
other services would show a lower "total" program
cost due solely to accounting methods.
6. The baseline cost level is supposedly
generated from the costs currently being
experienced, but these costs are not given.
7. Specific variations from the current status
have not been annotated, leaving doubt as to the
completeness of all the factors involved in the
consolidation program.
8. Numerous factors critical to a decision on
consolidation do not lend themselves to financial
quantification and are not considered in the
studies performed only along financial lines.
In examining the cost data, therefore, the reader is
receiving incomplete, and possibly misleading, information
because factors which may not be comparable are, in fact,
compared. Information is also included which is not
directly related to consolidation.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
illuminating areas of discrepancy, irrelevance,
non-comparability, and nDn-guantifiability contained in the
data prepared in support of the consolidation concept. This
chapter will also point out and discuss apparent
mis-information used by various agencies and individuals in
arguing their case for or against the cost effectiveness of
consolidation.
A. FIXED-WING TRAINING COSTS
The GAO and DOD figures both reflect the savings to be
realized by utilizing the TH-55 instead of buying the T-34C.
To counter this argument the Navy has repeatedly attempted




The Navy has argued, and others have later used the same
argument, that a combination of fixed-wing training followed
by rotary-wing training is less costly and more effective
than an all rotary-wing syllabus. This concept was used
unsuccessfully during the GAO study, due to the GAO*s
assumption that the TH-55 was "useable." It was also used
in a 38 page "Analysis of ITRO Helicopter Subcommittee Phase
II Final Report." (6) The argument used in the "analysis"
was again raised by Senator Dole, on the floor of the
Senate, during a debate on 2 August. (2, S 13076)
In the research phase of the GAO audit, the Navy costed
out an all-rotary- wing syllabus, substituting the TH-57
helicopter for initial training and the UH-1 for advanced
UHPT. The total rotary-wing syllabus costs ware greater
than the total cost of a mixed (fixed-rotary) syllabus. The
exact figures, hours, etc. are not availabl, but the GAO
asserted that "both of these helicopters are more expensive
to operate than the TH-55A helicopter the Army uses in the
early training phases of its program.
"
(1 f 10) The GAO failed
to explain that the Army uses the UH-1 in the later stages
of OHPT.
The Navy also made a comparison of an all-rotary-wing
syllabus and a "mixed" syllabus being used in some flight
schools in the public sector. See Tab A of the Navy's
analysis of the ITRO study. Appendix C to this report.
The comparison of the costs of the civilian schools,
while meaningful to a civilian pursuing such a program, is
an irrelevant argument against consolidation unless the Navy
intends to utilize a fixed-wing training aircraft which
could be acquired and operated at a much lower cost than the
T-3UC. In the example used, the cost of operating a Cessna
150 aircraft was compared to that of a Hughes 500
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helicopter. The costs of operation for these two aircraft
were $20 per hour and $9'4 per hour respectively, creating an
obvious savings by using the Cessna 150- Currently,
however, the T-34C is not forecast to approximate one-fifth
the costs of operation of the TH-57 or the UH-1. The ITRO
committee utilized $45.07 for the T-34C and $71.94 for the
TH-57. The 5:1 ratio of costs is a dramatic but irrelevant
example.
The cost differential of the Cessna 150 and the T-34C is
significant due to differences in the specifications for
airframe stress, the instrumentation and navigation
equipment, and engine. Whereas the civilian flight school
may have three or four versions of the "150" to be used for
primary instrument and familiarization, advanced
radio-navigation, and aerobatics, the military buys aircraft
capable of performing all the missions expected in the
syllabus. Generally speaking, the military aircraft
receives heavier utilization undermore arduous conditions,
and the syllabi require the flexibility of a multi-use
aircraft.
The "Comparison of Operating Costs for Comparable
Syllabi," Table II in Appendix C, is a much more valid
comparison, though still unrealistic because the T-34C
operating costs are speculative and the aircraft is not
ammortized. Amortization of the T-34C initial cost and a
higher operating cost could even-out or reverse the cost
differentials presented in the table. A speculative $60 per
hour operating cost, vice the $45 per hour used, and an
assumed 15 year straight-line amortization of the $23
million cost, for an output of 500 students per year would
add approximately $4,417 to the costs presented for the 190




The $2 f 029 difference, between the $19,089 per student
LRPTS Syllabus and the $17,060 Army Syllabus, is inflated
somewhat by the $15 per hour additional operating cost for
the T-34C in the example above. If this operating cost
difference is eliminated, the difference between the LRPTS
and Army syllabi is only $679. For this modest cost
increase the Navy would obtain the "Integrated Method" of
instruction, suitably equipped and instrumented aircraft for
the maritime mission, and a syllabus designed specificaly
for Navy and Marine helicopter pilots.
The question of fixed-wing training for prospective
helicopter pilots is not strictly that of one-time costs for
acquisition of T-34C aircraft. The initial cost amortized
over the life of the aircraft, the value of the additional
training received, and the amount of learning per
flight-hour are valid points which must be decided upon
before a decision on all-helicopter training or
consolidation in an all-helicopter training syllabus should
be made. If an all-helicopter syllabus, using the IFTS
method, is considered superior, a valid comparison should
consider the amortized cost of an all-UH-1 syllabus (using
excess Army helicopters) , or the development of a new,
fully-instrumented basic training helicopter. Of course,




ALTERNATIVE TO THE TH-55 OR TH-57
An alternative to the use of the TH-55 helicopter would
be the acquisition of a turbine-powered, instrumented, basic
training helicopter for the use of all services. Each of
these new helicopters would be instrumented and equipped to
satisfy the training requirements of all the services.
Training simulators, with a capability equivalent to or
superior to the Army 2B24 would also be purchased. This
alternative would overcome the disadvantages and limited
utility of the TH-55 and TH-57. The expected acquisition
cost of such an aircraft would be, as estimated in the
Navy's "Analysis," about $ 0.6 million each, a cost of $117
million for an estimated 195 TH-X aircraft to support an
annual flow of 1200 students. The operating cost could be
as much as twice, or as Idw as 1.5 times, that of the T-34C.
C. STUDENT ATTRITION
The Navy, in its arguments against consolidation, as
contained in the "Analysis," contends that a side-effect of
no fixed-wing training, common for all student pilot inputs,
is an expected increase in attrition during training. The
rationale behind this viaw is that fixed-wing training for
all students currently provides the service with a screening
device, helpful in determining those students most likely to
complete training in any particular pipeline, whether helo,
prop, or jet. Without this "screening," attrition could be
expected to increase because of the assignment of
individuals with a low expectancy of completion to the jet
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syllabus. The Navy is currently experiencing close to 22
percent attrition, the Army, 18 percent; the Marines, 5.8
percent. The DOD average is 11.5 percent for all pilot
training. (7,31)
Tab E of the "Analysis" of the ITRO report claims
increased attrition in the jet/prop pipelines due to a
lowering of the quality of student input to those programs.
The cause is the lack of a total filtering capability, a
result of selecting the helicopter pipeline student prior to
fixed-wing training. This procedure allows for some of the
higher-quality, higher potential individuals to enter into
the UHPT syllabus, whereas they were previously channeled
into the jet/prop pipelines. UHPT attrition losses, under
this condition, would probably decrease. Section (D) of
this chapter discusses the effects of the fixed-wing
screening process.
1 . Attrition Costs
If increased attrition by jet and prop pipelines
were, in fact, to result from direct entrance into helos by
some pilots, it has been estimated that this would amount to
38 students per year (15 jet at a cost of $780,000 and 23
prop at a cost of $350,000). (6)
A breakdown of CNET FY-75 cost figures, references
9-13, indicates that 3.58 percent of all student inputs fail
to complete the Environmental Indoctrination period
pr€Ceeding flight training, for a loss of 116 student weeks,
costing $1,190 per week. The Primary T-34 training stage
experienced an 8.58 percent attrition, 485 student-weeks
lost, and an average cost of $1,589 per student waek. Basic
Prop-Helo, consisting mainly of instrument, navigation, and
night training in the T-28, experienced a 17.35 per-cent
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attrition, a loss of 1163 student -weeks at a cost of $1,686
per week, and resulted in a loss of $19,418 per
student- attrition. The Basic Helicopter stage (TH-57)
experienced 0.42 percent attrition, and a loss of six
student- weeks at a cost of $2,030 per week. The Advanced
Helicopter (UH-1) stage experienced a 4.98 percent loss for
a total of 138 attrition-weeks at a cost of $3,465 per week.
Fiscal Year 1975 data indicated a helicopter
training input of 556 students, 28 percent attrition, 400
student output, and 350 student- weeks lost for a total
attrition-loss of 3.36 million dollars.
The following table, Figure (7), summarizes the
actual and pro-rated costs of FY-75 helicopter training.
These costs include direct training; direct support;
indirect support; pro- rated command and staff costs;
pro-rated staff and instructor travel costs; capital
equipment and aircraft maintenance and depreciation; student
travel, pay, and allowances; pro-rated cost of operation of
the OSS Lexi ngton (C7T-16) for helicopter carrier landing
training.
TABLE 1. ATTRITION/COMPLETION BT TRAINING SEGMENTS
PROGRAM COMPLETES X ATTHITE COST COST PER AVG«
SEGMENT PER ATTRITE $ COST
ATTRITES COMPLETE PER WK«
PREPLIGHT 1775 66 3.58 $4,186 $ 2,090 1,189
PRIMARY T-34 1704 160 8.58 9,613 4,676 1,542
BASIC T-28 481 101 17.35 38,803 38,803 1,686
BASIC TH-57 472 2 0.42 11,431 6,091 2,030
ADVANCED 0H-1 400 21 4.98 45,501 22,773 3,465
FY-75 TOTAL COST PER STODENT COMPLETION $ 109,536
FY-75 TOTAL COST OF ATTRITIONS 3,360,304




Also evident in the table is the average total cost
per student-week as training moves to more advanced stages
in more advanced and costly aircraft, of special interest
to this study is the cost per student- week in the fixed-wing
versus rotary-wing aircraft.
The attrition problem is in two main areas, failure
in academic or flight portions of the syllabus and student
voluntary withdrawal, labeled as "Dropped On Request" or
"DOR" students. The Navy has recently experienced an
overall average of approximately 25 percent voluntary
withdrawal in the early stages of training in all pipelines,
with a decreasing proportion of DORs in the later stages of
training, but an increasing proportion of flight-failures.
2. "Dro p On Request" Students
Numerous reasons have been proposed for the
unacceptably high DOR rate in the Navy flight training
program, with minimum results obtained in repeated attempts
to pre-identify these students prior to the costly in-flight
phases of training. Physiological, psychological,
motivational, educational, and a myriad of personal factors
all appear to be present. Assignment of individuals to a
type aircraft he/she was not suited for or had no desire for
is also apparently a factor. The "assignment" factor is
further subdivided in the areas of personal desirs, ability
to master the learning requirements, and the psychological
effects of training towards the advertised "glory" and
"glamor" of a jet-carrier aviator, as depicted in recruiting
advertisements and by the flight demonstration taam, or a




Some individuals desiring transport or helicopter
training yield to peer pressure and/or staff pressure,
opting for jet training while harboring various self-doubts
about individual competency and future training intensity,
eventually failing or withdrawing from training. The
inverse of the above pattern also exists, when a highly
motivated and self-confident student is unable to or
prohibited from entering the jet training pipeline. This
type of student may feel "failure" before the particular
pipeline training commences, withdrawing immediately or as
soon as training requirements increase to slightly above the
deflated motivational level.
Figures for later years being unavailable, calendar
year 1973 figures on total training input, pre-training test
guestionaire scores, and DOR versus completion rates, are
presented in the following table. The two tests
administered prior to selection for flight training are the
Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR) and Aviation Qualification Test
(AQT) as described in detail in Appendix D. Minimum cut-off
score for each is 3, the maximum is 6. The table depicts
completions and attritions for the various combinations
achieved on the two test batteries. Of the total of 1285
students input, 977 completed (76%) , 84 experienced flight
failure (6.5%), 9 failed accademicaly (0.7%), and 215 were
DORs (16.7%). Of those students achieving an A2T score of
3, barely 51 percent completed training, with a 58 percent
completion rate for those achieving an FAR score of 3.
Consolidation would, under the current system, cause
assignment of students to the helicopter syllabus based
exclusively on academic grades achieved during
"Environmental Indoctrination." Officers within the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations and on the staff of the
Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) indicate that they
would expect an increase in the DOR rate within the
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helicopter pipeline and an increase of the flight-failure
rate within the jet pipeline, should consolidation be
effected. Both increases are attributed to the decreased
screening capability and the randomness of pipeline
assignment. These same sources decline to place a dollar
value on the attrition losses expected. A speculative ten
percent increase would, however, increase the annual loss to
$3.69 million in the helicopter pipeline.
An increased flight-failure rate in the jet pipeline
would cause an even more severe annual cost increase, due to
the higher costs of operation and training with the aircraft
involved. There is no factual information indicating that
the DOR rate would not increase in this pipeline also. Some
Department of the Navy and CNATRA staff personnel feel that
the DOR rate may increase in all pipelines simultaneously,
effectively raising annual training costs by as much as four
million dollars.
The main consideration in examining these estimates
and expectations, however, is that they are not founded on
any scientific, statistical, or verifiable data. They are
purely speculative in their indication that increased costs









































































































































TABLE 2. Completions/attritions as a factor of Flight
Aptitude Rating (FAR) and Aviation Qualification Test (AQT)





D. FIXED-WING TRAINING AS A SELECTION DEVICE
In the Navy's "analysis" of the ITRO report, an attempt
was made to quantify expected additional costs of
consolidation due to the loss of the fixed-wing screening
process. A final "additional" annual recurring cost of
$1,341,000 was claimed, based upon an expected percentage
increase in attrition for those students placed in the prop
and jet pipelines.
The Navy's pipeline selection process is based upon the
concept that the students with the highest grades in
selected academic subjects, and on their primary flights in
the T-34, are the most likely to complete training through
to designation as a Naval Aviator. Also assumed is the fact
that the students with the best grades are required as
inputs to the jet syllabus, and the students with the lower
grades should be assigned to the helicopter syllabus. Upon
completion of T-34 Primary training, the students are asked
to choose their desired path. Those with the highest grades
are given the opportunity to select jets, those with grades
in the "mid-range" the opportunity to select prop or helo,
and those in the low range, helos only. In most instances,
the "hi-flyer" with the best grades chooses either the jet
pipeline, is "encouraged to" select the jet pipeline, or is
presented with the option of selecting only the jet
pipeline. Students with high grades are not presently
accepted as volunteers for helicopter training.
Of a sample of 1385 students completing primary flight
training and used as a reference group in the "Analysis"
(Appendix E) , it may be seen that of the students receiving
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a flight-grade above 3.03 (28%), only eight percent were
assigned to helicopter training. Of the students receiving
less than a 3.00 flight grade, 6 percent went into the jet
pipeline and 69 percent were directed into the helicopter
pipeline.
E. ALTERNATIVE TO FIXED-WING SCREENING
1 • "Simulator " Research, Development, and Potential
The Navy has tasked the Training Analysis and
Evaluation Group (TAEG) of Orlando, Florida, with developing
an alternative screening method, to replace the use of
fixed-wing aircraft. Dr. B. Browning and Dr. A. Diehl and
associates are currently investigating the feasability of
the "simulator" screening concept discussed in references
(14) through (18). TAEG is utilizing the knowledge gained
through experimentation and development efforts of the APAMS
system, the 2B24 and research being done by Dr. Brian
Shipley at the Army Research Institute (ARI) , research at
the Aviation Research Laboratory at the University of
Illinois, and numerous projects run at the Air Force Human
Resources Laboratory (AFHRL)
.
Dr. Valentine, AFHRL, involved in the "Hasty Blue"
research using the ground trainer as a predictive
measurement device, is also working on a combination of
ground trainer exercises and paper and pencil psychological





Although the current research and development costs
are very high, the potential benefits over time far outweigh
these costs. Distinct advantages of the selection devices,
over the Navy's current methodology of using the T-34
primary flight grades, are numerous. A single operator may
run three to four devices simultaneously on a computerized
time-share basis. Seasurement of applicant/student
capabilities on both learning rates and performance of
motor-coordination tests are scored objectively against
pre-set standards. The devices may be utilized, regardless
of weather conditions, 24 hours a day, for training as well
as testing and performance measurement. In addition,
applicants may be screened at various geographic points, not
just at the training site. It is hoped that the individual
and the service are assured of valid, comprehensive, and
objective measurement of the individual's capabilities as
they pertain to the various flight training pipelines and
the real-world task requirements of those courses of
instruction.
The capabilities of these and other proposed devices
are far-reaching. The simulators are controlled by digital
or analog computers; with full communications; computer
controlled task programming; and computer controlled
autopilot for demonstration of task requirements. Computer
scoring (with memory) for hard-copy printed output, full
spectrum task analysis with results in terms of raw-score,
standard' score, mean score, and standard deviation are
proposed. In the case of multi-cab units, such as the
2B-2U, each module may be simultaneously used for training,
demonstration, or testing. Additionally, and quite unlike
the current Navy "screen" system, the measurements of
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performance are equally valid for students/applicants with
or without previous flight experience. With this system,
the effect of previous flight training is minimized. At
present, previous flight experience may act to enhance a
students performance in certain phases of training,
enabling him/her to out-perform fellow students without such
experience. The inexperienced student may have the greater
potential, but it is not reflected in the initial flight
grades. The simulator levels out these experiential
differences and is better able to identify true potential.
The impact of the implementation of such devices is
also speculative at the present time and "state of the art,"
but the devices are claimed, by the researchers, to provide
substantial savings in the screening and selection of
applicants for flight training. The administration of this
screening, in conjunction with applicable personality and
psychological testing, further defines the individual's
probability of success, justifies pipeline assignment, and
allows the applicant/student pilot to experience a
simulation of the training to be experienced.
3 . Simulator Costs
Current data indicates that the existing 2B24
simulator operated by tha Army may be modified to perform
adequate task testing at a cost of approximately $5,000 per
training cab. A full-system global measurement capability
will cost approximately $20,000 per training cab. TAEG«s
research with the USAF GAT-1 indicates a one-time research
and development cost of $150,000 plus a $50,000 modification
cost per training cab. ARI projects savings due to
decreased attrition in recruit and applicant screening, of
$2 million annually. The cost of operation of these
simulators is less than one-tenth the cost of operation of
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the aircraft now used for the same purpose
F. DOD "FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS" COST SHEET
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the
cost data referred to in this report are the end-costs
supplied by the services, and used by the ITRO, GAO r and
members of Congress in making comparisons between various
programs. The costs included in and making up these totals
vary from time to time and from service to service.
Examples of areas in which the "user" may not fully
comprehend the meaning or completeness of the figures
provided to him are related below. Unfortunately, most of
the questions the "users" have asked remain unanswered
today.
The DOD "Funding Adjustments" Cost Sheet, Appendix F,
and reference (2), page S13063, supplied to Congress as part
of the FY-77 budget submission and the focal point of
discussion on the House and Senate floor, is a
self-contained summary of the reputed savings to be
experienced by DOD through consolidation. Several points,
however, remain to be answered even after the completion of
Congressional argument.
1 • Aircraft R eworks /Aircraft Changes
Note "§/" of the cost sheet states that these costs
are included in an aircraft maintenance contract. A savings
of $3.3 million for FI-77 and $4.4 million for subsequent
years is claimed for the Navy.
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The basis for the "savings" is not explained, nor
are the facts provided for the reader to determine whether
these savings are "consolidation oriented" or savings which
will be realized as the result of phasing out the T-28
aircraft. The increased costs of additional or expanded
maintenance contracts due to the Army's increased tempo of
operations is also not obvious. From the figures provided
the observer cannot determine if double counting of savings
occurs. If savings in this area are claimed for the Navy,
and a corresponding shift of costs is not reflected for the
Army, the "savings" are counted twice. Note "a/" to the
"funding adjustments" states that we must assume that this
does not occurr.
2. Military Personnel
Claimed savings in military personnel are $4 million
in FY-77 and $20.3 million for FY-78 and subsequent years.
If the Navy's total end- strength is going to be reduced by
that number of personnel (1470), they may be re-assigned to
fill the fleet billets which are currently vacant. The
problem remains that there are then 1470 shore-duty billets
unavailable when those personnel currently on sea-duty reach
their rotation dates. New shore-duty billets will have to
be created and at some additional cost. The savings of one
program are shifted to costs for several other programs.
3. Base, Release
The possible release of a Navy base to some other
use is claimed to provide a $5.5 million one-time savings.
Argument in both houses of Congress failed to identify the
specific base to be closed, or to which budget the new
function would be added. On February 9, 1976, Navy
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Secretary Middendorf testified before the House Committee
that
...it doesn't appear there would be any savings in
the 1977 fiscal year. In fact, our preliminary
studies show maybe an add-on cost, and any outyear
savings, from now through 1981, would occur only
by a base closure, which we might be doing
anyway. (19,118)
There is difficulty in comprehending the reliability of
the DOD cost estimations in light of the comments by
Secretary Middendorf. What base is released? Doubt exists
as to which fcase, whether one will be released to another
user or closed, whether the "savings" are simply shifted to
another portion of the budget, or whether there really are
savings in this area if consolidation were to take place.
Whiting Field, from which helicopter training would be
removed, would probably remain in use for T-34C training of
the students destined for the other pipelines. Air
operations at Saufley Field and Ellyson Field have already
been curtailed. Currently, multi-engine (propeller)
aircraft training is being accomplished at NAS, Corpus
Christi, Texas. Jet pipeline students are being trained at
Meridian, Mississippi, Beeville, Texas, and Kingsville,
Texas.
In an un-signed, un-dated, four-page "Fact Sheet" on
the subject of "Critique of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot
Training (UHPT) Consolidation Costing," issued by OSD and
claiming that "our comments have been solicited by
interested members and staff of the Congress," the following
paragraph addressed the question of a base release.
Base Release savings shown in Table 1 of
attachment 2 were based on less precise (and more
conservative) assumptions than are implied by the
item. Until decisions have been made on
particular base realignments, it is not possible
to address this issue other than to state the
conservative nature of the estimates.
Table one, referred to in the quote, is the DOD cost
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sheet for consolidation. The "item" referred to is a claim,
by Senators opposing consolidation, that tha savings
achieved by closing Corpus Christi Naval Air Station and
moving the tenant activities to Whiting Field would provide
a maximum savings of $2.6 million vice the $23 million
claimed. In other words, OSD would not clarify the question
other than to say that their figures were based on less
precise assumptions. Senator Tower, speaking against the
consolidation concept as it had thus far been defined,
stated the following in regard to the "base release":
First of all, over $29 million of the savings
cited by DOD—that is over 75 percent of the
annual savings "on paper"--woula stem from the
so-called release of a Navy flight training base.
For the benefit of my colleagues who may not be
familiar with bureaucratic jargon, let me explain
that the word "release" in this context in no way
means that our Government will save $29 million by
closing down a base used to train Naval Aviators.
The bureaucracy defines "release" as meaning the
transfer of costs related to this base away from
his own training category to someone else's
category of the defense budget. The fact of the
matter is that this $29 million savings is
actually no savings at all, but rather a mere
accounting change which would result in this $29
million simply being moved over into another
account of DOD's budget. (2,S13070)
4. Aircraft Procurement
The $26 million "savings" achieved through the
cancellation of an "intended" procurement of T-34C aircraft
and two simulators, makes up approximately 85 percent of the
first year savings claimed by DOD. Although impressive in
the "Funding Adjustments" tabulation, this amount was not
involved in the FY-77 budget. When the House Subcommittee
deleted consolidation from the budget, a net change
(increase) of $7 million was required to support
continuation of the status quo. (3 , H6072) The timely
coincidence of T-34C procurement for the Naval Air Training




5- Operations and Maintenance
DOD cost comparisons are of a consolidated,
all-services, all-rotary-wing syllabus and the use of the
T-3UC in a separate fixed-wing/rotary-wing Navy training
program. It is not known if Army costs were increased to
include the teaching of instrument navigation in the more
costly to operate DH-1 vice the TH-55.
If the service unique portion of the training time
in the UH-1 is used to satisfy instrument training
requirements only, the cost of this training increases
significantly compared to the NIFTS concept. use of the
"service unique" portioo for instruments also appears to
preclude the maritime missions of confined area maneuvering
with regard to shipboard landings. Either this training
would be removed from the syllabus or would be pushed back
and done in post-UHPT in the H-2, H-3, or H-46 aircraft, at
even greater expense.
If service unique training is to include shipboard
landings, additional costs will be incurred in providing a
three-day or one-week per month detachment of students,
instructor pilots, maintenance personnel, aircraft, and
logistic support to the Pensacola area or other staging area
in the vicinity of operating ships. The students would
"back-log" at Fort Rucker until a scheduled detachment is
available or, in order to avoid back-logs, shipboard
training would have to be conducted before completion of the
combined-services training. Additional unforeseen costs may
also be incurred by contracting for civilian instrument
instructors, a development being discussed by Navy and Army
training personnel in September, 1976.
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6. Staff and Support
Also unseen in the DOD figures are the additional
incurred costs attributable to staffing; funding of staff
and student TAD (TDY) travel from environmental training at
the Pensacola complex to Ft. Rucker; visits etc. of CNATRA
and CNET personnel to Ft. Rucker; and the establishment of a
Navy and Marine administrative staff at Ft. Rucker.
7* Recr uiting a nd Selection
Completely omitted from the DOD, GAO, ITRO reports
and the Navy's ,l Analysis ,, of the ITRO report is the expected
increased costs of Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and
pilot selection programs. This omission precludes
consideration of the difficulties of pre-designating
helicopter pilots from a general pool r the recruiting of
direct inputs into helicopter training, or the recruiting of
Naval Aviators having an opportunity to request and receive
jet, multi-engine, or helicopter training.
On December 2, 1970, the Office of the Commandant of
the Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) , submitted a
Point Paper to the Chief of Staff outlining what were
considered "intangible" benefits of pilot training conducted
in the Naval Air Training Command. At that time, besides
sending student pilots to helicopter training with the Army,
Marine student jet pilots were also training with the Air
Force. One point in the paper specifically noted the effect
of this program on recruiting:
Our recruiters have been faced with overcoming a
credibility gap with the highly educated and
astute campus candidate of contemporary times when
they attempt to outline the Marine Corps flight
training program which includes pipelines with the
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Army, OSAF and Naval Training Command. Many
candidates state that if they wanted Army or USAP
training they would join that service. During
1970 only 9% of our aviation candidates requested
Army training, and there are sound indications
that the per diem associated with Army training
was their inducement to select that pipeline.
The Marine Corps Deputy Director of Personnel,
responding to a request from the Deputy Chief of staff
(Air) , submitted a list of comments on the "Effects of
Procurement and Attrition" of consolidating helicopter pilot
training with the Army and eliminating fixed-wing training.
The following paragraphs are quoted from that report, dated
January 11, 1971.
(3) A second-class military service image of the
Marine "Corps would ""evolve." "To^ntial student
aviators would be uninfluenced by Officer
Selection Officers, who, on one hand would claim
to represent a first class military service, and
on the other hand would have to admit it does not
even train its own pilots....
(4) Marine Student Naval Aviators find Arm^y
helicopter training a particularly disagreeable
assignment . In ~£Ke past two years, two sluHen^s
assigne<TTo Army training have complained to their
congressmen. One other refused his orders. Of
687 Student Naval Aviators expressing their choice
of assignment to Army, Air Force or Navy flight
training in FY 70 and FY 71 to date, less than 10%
wanted to go Army (in spite of the common
knowledge that per diem payments in excess of$3000.00 during Army training regularly result in
considerable personal financial gain)....
NOTE : Procurement competitiion would probably
force undesirable changes in Marine Corps
policy. ¥e woulcl sooner-orrIater be forced to
move toward Army standards to get helicopter
pilots: shorter service obligation (2 years after
flight training) , lower academic background (high
school graduates) , aviators with less than full
career officer potential (Warrant Officers^ , and
all past efforts to avoid a second-class citizenry
among helicopter pilots would be compromised.
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G. FY-77 DOD BUDGET AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Numerous items of information essential to achieving a
rational decision on consolidation, based upon cost factors
alone, were omitted from the two page justification included
in the FY-77 budget proposal by DOD. The DOD budget
indicated an intent to consolidate, with the "funding
adjustments" and "manpower adjustments" listings (Appendix
F) included to show the validity of the intent.
Congressman Sikes, (Florida) in a floor debate on June
17, 1976, stated:
...DOD has not defined its program. We have
fragmented statements, uncertain cost figures, and
an obvious attempt at an end run to avoid the
directive of congress that the Department of
Defense justify helicopter training consolidation.
This they have not done. They have simply
inserted it in the budget. (3 ,H6085)
In the same debate, Congressman Flynt (Georgia)
remarked that:
The stated purpose of this proposed consolidation
is to save money but the figures submitted in
support of this claim are, I believe,
unintentionally incomplete and possibly
misleading. There are intangibles which cannot be
quantified which nevertheless would be real costs
which do not appear in the figures used to support
the proposed consolidation. (3,H6086)
The House and Senate Appropriations Committee, during
the FY-77 budget hearings, attempted to decipher the real
and implied costs and savings involved in the proposal.
They heard testimony from service chiefs which officially
supported, but personally disagreed with, the OSD budget
figures. As a result of these hearings, both Committees
declined to approve the consolidation proposal, as submitted
in the DOD budget.
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Congressional debate on defense issues involving the
relocation of bases and personnel is normally dominated by
those having the most parochial interest in the issue. The
consolidation of helicopter training, involving a
relocation/reduction of approximately 2500 DOD personnel in
Florida (with their corresponding income) , a possible base
closing in Texas, and an increase in military residents in
Alabama, certainly raises the possibility of parochial
interest. Such consolidation would also provide a
foot-in-the-door for sarvice-wide consolidation of other
training, e.g., jet training with the Air Force in Arizona.
For others, the mere linking of the words "cost" and
"savings," solicits their vigorous and highly publicized
support.
While it would be easy to discount any argument on this
issue with a cynical comment on parochialism, objective
analysis of the Congressional debate should discount the
effects of the speaker's bias. In other words, parochial
interest is not always the clear motivator behind every
argument. In fact, it is such an obvious detractor from a
speaker's credibility that some comment will usually be made
in order to recognize that interest and put it aside from
the beginning.
As Congressman Dickinson (Alabama) said, while speaking
in support of the consolidation amendment:
Let me say first that Fort Rucker is in my
district. I have a very parochial interest here
and I am the first to admit it. . . But aside from
that let's just talk about the facts and
figures-just the facts and the figures. (3, H60 83)
Congressman Edwards (Alabama) further clarified his more
cosmopolitan concern:
The issue at stake here today, Mr. Chairman, goes
far beyond the question of Fort Rucker versus
Pensacola. A much higher principle is involved,
and this is whether or not base closures,
realignments, and interservice training
consolidations are desirable. (3 ,H6082)
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Parochialism, therefore, is so easily recognized that
the effective Congressman can only convince his audience
with the most logical arguments and clearly supported facts.
Rather than list the recorded vote, mention will be
made here of those Congressmen who spoke during the floor
debates in the House and Senate. These Congressmen
evidently felt most strongly about the issue and had done
some research, however limited, in an attempt to support
their arguments.
As mentioned earlier, the House Appropriations
Committee failed to approve that part of the DOD budget
which provided for consolidation (an increase of $10.1
million in Army training funds) and funded $17.5 million for
the Navy to continue its own training. When the budget was
put before the House for a vote, however, Congressman
Edwards (Alabama) , a member of the Appropriations Committee,
offered an amendment which would reverse the Committee's
decision on consolidation. Supporting him in separate
statements on the floor were Congressmen Dickinson
(Alabama) ,Harkin (Iowa) , and Robinson (Virginia) . Those
questioning the consolidation proposal and arguing in
support of the Committee's decision were Congressmen Sikes
(Florida) , Chappell (Florida) , White (Texas) , Flynt
(Georgia) , and Montgomery (Mississippi) . After a lengthy
debate, the amendment was passed by a vote of the House, 288
to 110.
In the Senate, a similar scenario took place. The
Appropriations Committee declined to approve the
consolidation proposal. Consequently, Senators Proxmire
(Wise), Goldwater (Arizona), Sparkman (Alabama), and Allen
(Alabama) sponsored an amendment to the budget which would
reinstate interservice training of helicopter pilots.
Opposing arguments were presented by Senators Chiles
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(Florida) , Young (North Dakota) , Glenn (Ohio) , Garn (Utah)
,
Tower (Texas) , Stone (Florida) , and Pearson (Kansas)
The Congressional Record shows that those opposing
consolidation in the Senate seemed to have done more
research than those in the House. Perhaps, sinca the House
debate was held on June 17 and the Senate discussed the
issue later, on August 2, 1976, the Senators were able to
more thoroughly research the subject. The recorded
statements indicate that Congressmen on both sides of the
issue had not considered many of the developments discussed
in this paper. Savings estimates were rounded up, if the
speaker was for consolidation, and quoted exactly or
discounted if the speaker was against the proposal.
Certainly, with DOD, Army, and Navy estimates, there were
enough figures from which to choose.
Senator Stennis (Mississippi) , towards the end of the
debate, best described the uncertainty that prevailed:
Mr. President, the first point I want to make is
that all this points out clearly the situation we
are in: Facts in dispute, uncertainty about
alleged savings. some uncertainty about the
courses, fortify the chairman's position that this
ought to be carried over, the amendment left out.
It will be wide open, then
e
in conference for some
kind of adjustment. I think whatever is done, it
can be better adjusted than to be locked in here
by the hard language of House and Senate
amendments. (2,S13071)
The amendment was subsequently defeated by a roll vote
of 61 to 28. The FY-77 budget was approved without the DOD
provision for consolidation of OHPT.
Unfortunately, for all concerned, the cost figures
discussed were on an incrremental-decremental basis, without
sufficient justification of detail, and were as complete and
informative as a corporation's annual report without
footnotes. Congress was placed in a position of
decision-making in the dark. The DOD and ITRO figures were
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manipulations and comparisons made on cost data provided to
them. It is not clear that the data provided were
calculated on the same basis and included the same
equivalent costs for each service. The Financial Analysis
office of the Chief of Naval Education and Training has
indicated that differences between the Army and Navy
accounting systems preclude an accurate comparison of such
data.
H. FOLLOW ON FIXED-WING TRAINING
Certain billets in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard are expected to require transition training of
helicopter pilots into fixed-wing aircraft. Although some
transitioning training is now conducted, a rotary- wing-only
pilot is expected to require an additional 65 hours of
Primary fixed-wing training. During Fiscal Tears 1969
through 1971 the Army trained approximately 492 Marine Corps
helicopter pilots for duty in Vietnam. These pilots were
designated "rotary-wing only" aviators upon receiving their
wings instead of the nDrmal designation of "Naval aviator"
given to their Navy dual-trained counterparts. Due to a
stated Marine Corps need for flexibility in the rapid
reassignment of helicopter pilots to billets requiring
fixed-wing training, these Army-trained officers found their
career opportunities severely limited. Consequently, during
FY-73, a program was established by the Chief of Naval Air
Training to requalify those career officers who, upon
completing their first operational helicopter tour, desired
training in fixed-wing aircraft and the removal of the
"rotary- wing only" designation.
Tab F of the Navy "analysis" indicates a total added
cost of consolidation at an annual rate of $2,459,300 plus a
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one-time acquisition cost of $3,051,500 for the necessary
aircraft (T-34C) to support the transition program. These
data were based upon expected helicopter pilot training
rates, and annual billet requirements for the next five
years, yielding an estimated transition flow of 33 USN, 86
USMC, and 15 USCG pilots per year.
The text of the "analysis 11 stated, in comparing the
transition hours required to bring OSMC helicopter pilots up
to entrance standards for fixed-wing readiness squadrons
(presumably for A-4 and F-4 aircraft)
.
...the Army trained helo pilot has required 169
fixed-wing hours more than his Navy trained
contemporary to achieve the same level of
proficiency. ..if the Marine Corps experience
were to oe repeated with aviators requiring
fixed-wing transition under the All-Helicopter
syllabus the annual cost of the transition program
would be about 11.5 million dollars instead of the
$2,459 million cited above. (6,19)
I. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE SYLLABUS COSTS
The purpose of the following chart is to compare the
costs of the differing proposed syllabi. It must be
realized that the cost figures are for aircraft operating
costs only, and that they may be totally inaccurate.
Training Command staff personnel (CNATRA) indicate that the
cost-per-hour of operating the TH-57 may rise to $200 during
FY-77. The costs below are based upon the values used by
the ITRO committee in their calculations, though they can
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VIII. CONSOLIDATION AND INTEGRATION OF MAJOR FACTORS
A. INTEGRATED FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEM
The merits of integrating instrument and contact flight
techniques at the very beginning of student pilot training
was recognized by the FAA and others in the 1950s.
Furthermore / the Navy has validated the integrated flight
training concept, its application to military training
requirements, and its efficiency in the training of military
pilots, (see Chapt. IV)
The TH-55 and TH-57 aircraft cannot, at a reasonable
cost, be fitted with an instrument capability suitable for
support of the IFTS concept. In their present configuration
they are not useable for instruction under the integrated
flight training system.
The clear requirement for an instrument training
capability implicit in the FAA's opinion of the Integrated
Flight System and the findings of the Navy's "Eagle Program"
(Chapter V) , dominated the definition of the operational
requirements for the successor -to the aging T-34B trainer.
The T-34C primary trainer was the aircraft which was chosen
to fill these requirements.
If IFTS is a valid operational tool, its
cost-effectiveness must be compared to a valid appraisal of
the cost-effectiveness of consolidation.
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B. INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TIME AND THE "NAVY-UNIQUE" SYLLABUS
The proposed consolidated syllabus sacrificies all
maritime environment training in order to give Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard student helicopter pilots 21.5 hours
more instrument flight practice and 8.5 hours more practice
in navigation and emergency procedures. This brings the
total instrument time to 4 1.5 hours. The Navy currently
gives its students 60.3 hours of instrument flight time
(33.8 hours T-28, and 26.5 UH-1), plus 1.5 hours in carrier
qualifications and shipboard flying techniques.
One of the primary Congressional arguments in favor of
consolidation has been that, while the consolidated
helicopter syllabus provides less total instrument time
overall, it provides more helicopter flight training than
the current Navy syllabus. It is precisely this lack of
instrument time, however, which necessitates using the
"Navy-unique" phase for additional instrument work instead
of, as originally plained, training in specific Naval
operations. Instrument time is also as transferable from
aircraft to aircraft as it is from simulator to aircraft.
C. FLIGHT SIMULATION
The proposed consolidated syllabus allows 40 hours for
instrument flight simulation in the 2B24 UH-1 simulator.
The Navy currently provides 31.2 hours of instrument
simulation in the 2B21 (1-28) simulator and 28 hours in the
2B18 (UH-1) simulator. Total instrument simulation time
currently afforded to Navy trained pilots amounts to 54.2
79

hours. The consolidated syllabus provides more helicopter
simulated flight time, but less simulation overall.
The Army's 2B24 simulator is superior to the Navy's 2B18
sumulator and is under-utilized at Fort Rucker. A new
instrument simulator for the T-34C is being develsped by the
Training Analysis and Evaluation Group, Orlando, Florida.
D. RECIPROCATING VERSUS JET ENGINE
The TH-57 is superior to the TH-55 in familiarizing
Navy/Marine Corps pilots with rotary-wing aircraft because,
like every operational helicopter in the fleet, it has a jet
engine. Engine performance characteristics and instrument
indicators and indications are radically different from
those found in aircraft with reciprocating engines.
E. VALUE OF FIXED-WING TRAINING
Instructional and/or learning advantages are the weakest
arguments used to justify fixed-wing training for helicopter
pilots. It is valid, however, to argue the proven
superiority of the Integrated Flight System and the related
reguirement for an instrumented primary training aircraft.
It is less costly to purchase and operate a fully
instrumented fixed-wing airplane than a comparable
helicopter. The majority of flight learning skills are
transferable, especially instrument procedures.
The needs of the Marine Corps, on a large scale, and of
the Navy, on a smaller scale, require the assignment
flexibility provided by some aviators being qualified in
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both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. This training is a
valid requirement and would have to be made available. Only
the timing of this training remains in question.
F. FIXED-WING TRAINING FOR PIPELINE SELECTION
Definite inadequacies exist in the Navy's use of initial
fixed-wing training as a screening and selection device for
the three training pipelines, i.e., jet/prop/helo. While
incorporation of the IFTS syllabus should improve
predictability, due primarily to the increased length of
time over which the student is evaluated, further research
and development in the area of task simulation devices
appears to be leading toward a more cost-effective method.
Consolidation in the research and development area, as
recommended by the Office of Defense Research and
Engineering (8) appears to be a valid goal, capable of
producing more uniform results and eliminating some
duplication.
G. GAO OBJECTIVITY
The GAO study was done at the request of Senators Proxmire
and Goldwater. The stated purpose of the study was not to
decide whether or not consolidation would provide
increased economy and efficiency. They were tasked with
identifying the increased economies and efficiencies
obtainable through standardizing and consolidating the
various helicopter pilot training programs of the military
services. (1) Congress "knew" the efficiencies were there,
GAO's task was to identify them.
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CONGRESSIONAL AND SERVICE PAROCHIALISM
Parochial interests on each side only served to
highlight the conflicting data and conclusions supplied by
various government agencies involved in the consolidation
issue. The resultant confusion emphasizes the need for a
calm, objective reappraisal of the facts , to determine the
costs, benefits, and effects of consolidation.
Fears that pilots trained only in helicopters will feel
like "second class citizens" in the aviation community, as
reported by the Marine Corps, during their Army flight
training experience, are considered invalid arguments.
While control of a rotary-wing aircraft in an operational
environment is considered to require more skill and
coordination than control of a fixed-wing aircraft, the Navy
and Marine Corps have long expounded the glamor and glory of
jet/carrier aviation. If the helicopter pilot perceives
himself as a "second class citizen" it is not because he is
inferior, but because he has been conditioned to feel that
way. This morale problem is internal to the Navy as a
whole, may have been fostered by the current "screening""
process, and must be addressed regardless of any decision on
consolidation.
An all-volunteer service is contingent upon recruitment
of quality individuals. Therefore, limitation of career
opportunities is considered a valid argument against
helicopter-only training. Any constraints on the assignment
of promotional opportunities of one aviation pipeline vice




I. FEASIBILITY OF A COMMON SYLLABUS
Due to the differing missions, a common helicopter
training syllabus for all military services appears to
require compromise at the risk of lower quality. Instrument
flight training requirements for naval aviators, set by the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations, have always been
higher than those of the Army, because of the differences in
the flight environment of the two services. The compromise
on the consolidated syllabus necessitates sacrificing the
valuable maritime training in the Navy-unique phase for
additional instrument training. The Air Force has
experienced similar problems with Army training. Air Force
pilots, trained by the Army, require an additional 54 hours
flight time, 25.5 hours simulation time, and 63 hours of
classroom instruction in order to qualify as operational
night rescue pilots. (2, S1 3067) A syllabus which completely
met Air Force or Navy standards would cause an axtravagant
over-training of Army pilots.
Consequently, we have the present proposed situation:
consolidation for the sake of unsubstantiated and
contradictory estimates of cost savings, based on a syllabus
using out-of-date training methods which require additional
expenditure to produce the current level of training.
The fact that this is only basic helicopter training, so
often pointed out by supporters of consolidation, is
misleading. Whereas in civilian basic training the student
pilot learns to fly a helicopter, the military student
receives a helicopter pilot qualification within a totally
mission-oriented system. This concept saves duplication of
effort by combining qualification and mission performance
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training. Thus r to accomplish each service's unique
mission, navigation, flight techniques, and emergency
procedures (such as ditching drills and water survival) are
presented from the first day of training. Basic training is
much more than take-offs and landinas.
J. POTENTIAL FOR COST SAVINGS
Numerous areas offering the potential of future cost
savings have been identified. The validity of accepting
"savings'1 at whatever cost is subject to discussion. The
Congressional debates and hearings, position papers of the
services, the GAO and ITRO studies, and the letters
"requesting support" sent between Congressional colleagues,
all cover most of the facets of the consolidation concept.
Quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs and benefits exist.
1 . Dnder-utilizat ion of Army Assets
Twenty-nine percent utilization of the training
capability existing at Fort Rucker is a factor offering
potential savings, allowing consolidation without
significant expansion costs. The availability of 565 excess
TH-55 helicopters presents an opportunity for someone to use
them, at the nominal cost of depreser vation and logistic
movement
.
Under-utilization of both of these "assets" is,
however, a result of the expansion of a capability needed in
the past and now excess. Funds were expended and sunk into
a needed capability. The capability is no longer needed and
the assets have been declared excess, with appropriate steps
taken to preserve the assets until the capability is needed
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again. These expenditures are "sunk costs" and are
irrelevant in the current time-frame with respect to
consolidation.
With the decrease in training requirements for Navy,
Marine, and Coast Guard helicopter pilots, the Navy closed
Ellyson and Saufley fields, consolidating at Whiting Field,
in an attempt to make the best use of existing assets at the
lowest cost. Without this internal consolidation the Navy
too would be under-utilizing its assets.
Whether with ships, aircraft, or other military
hardware, the services periodically experience assets in
excess to their needs, particularly after a war. Training
capability and helicopters just happen to be excess to the
Army at this time. The use of these assets, as an end in
itself, regardless of other consequences, is inconsistent
with effective management principles.
2 . Aircraft Acq uisi tion
The T-34C aircraft is being purchased as a
replacement for the T-28 in the Navy's integrated flight
training syllabus. The r-28 has reached the end of its
serviceable life.
A savings of $26 million is claimed for
consolidation due to the elimination of the need for
approximately seventy-six of these aircraft. These savings
are calculated on a one-time basis and are not amortized
over the useful life of the aircraft. A purchase of a
portion of these "eliminated" aircraft will be necessary to
support a fixed-wing transition program for career officers
in approximately five years. Furthermore, a reduction in the
number of aircraft ordered in the initial acquisition
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contract will increase, somewhat, the per-unit cost of the
remaining number of aircraft.
3. Cost of the In|L§Sl!Lated Flight Training System
The Integrated Flight Training System presupposes
the use of an aircraft with certain minimum capabilities.
If the IFTS is considered valid, whether used under a
consolidated service-wida program or by the Navy alone, the
higher initial cost of acquiring adequate aircraft and the
higher operations and maintenance costs of these aircraft
must be borne. Comparison of both acquisition and
operations/maintenance costs of fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft in this category indicates that the cost of an
all- rotary-wing syllabus is far in excess of that required
by a combination fixed-rotary-wing syllabus, while providing
an equivalent quality end-product.
The cost of aircraft and simulators to support IFTS,
if amortized, is approximately equal to or less than the
savings received by the reduction in necessary flight time.
** • Eliminatio n of Fixed -Wing Traini ng
This factor provides measureable short-term savings
provided the TH-55 is used for a major proportion of the
total syllabus. Additional costs are incurred if the TH-55
fails to meet the training needs of the services and the
UH-1 must be used for a more significant portion of the
syllabus.
As discussed in previous sections of this report,
use of the TH-55 would degrade the current level of training
being received by students in the Navy syllabus. Use of the
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TH-55 or the TH-57 in an attempt to approximate an
integrated system of training would do little more than
prostitute the IFTS concept.
Elimination of fixed-wing training and conversion to
an all rotary-wing syllabus, to be cost effective, requires
a syllabus oriented to both what is taught and how it is
taught. Learning how to take-off and land is not the
ultimate goal, and an aircraft with a capability equal to
the syllabus requirements must be used. Table three in the
discussion of alternative syllabus costs, Chapter VII,
Section I, indicates the effects of balancing aircraft hours
to syllabus requirements in an all-rotary- wing program.
If the low-cost, available helicopters are used only
for that portion of the syllabus for which they are
effective, and the UH-1 is used for the remainder, a
significant rise in the per-student cost is experienced.
This cost may be lowered by the use of a fully instrumented,
turbine-powered, light helicopter, in an IFTS syllabus, as a
substitute for the T-34C and with a higher acquisition and
operational cost.
5. Base Releas e and^or Closure.
This factor provides a measureable savings if a base
is identified and closed, and the end strength of civilian
and military personnel is reduced net of any side-effect in
shore-duty rotations and civilian re-location. The
arguments presented by DDD and Congress have not identified
such a base, at the time of this writing. Navy controlled
aviation training facilities have already been de-activated
and consolidated, effectively cancelling out any additional
savings. The movement of helicopter training to Port Rucker
would have a minimal affect on current costs being
87

experienced at Whiting Field.
6. Aircraft Operating Costs
The computation of operating costs of the various
aircraft produces varying results depending upon how the
computation is conducted. Major differences between the
Army and Navy cost figures are due to the costs of the
maintenance systems used, and therefore upon which costs are
averaged, which are incremental, which marginal, etc. The
Army uses a contractual maintenance force for their TH-55
aircraft, while the Navy depends upon their own supply
system and military maintenance personnel. The cost of
contracted maintenance is a single, defineable figure. The
cost of Navy maintenance is a summation of individual
maintenance actions, with some averaged and some pro-rated
costs.
The ITRO Helicopter Subcommittee utilizsd a figure
of $71.94 per hour for the cost of operating the TH-57
helicopter. The "Plying Hour Cost Report" for Helicopter
Training Sguadron Eight (HT-8) , Appendix G, indicating the
costs experienced in June, 1976 and the total FY-76 period,
claims expenditure of $196,051 in FY-76 for 18,385 flight
hours. The costs included fuel, oil, lubricants, other
flight operations costs, and aviation maintenance, for an
average of $10.66 per hour. Figures for the month of June,
1975 were $16,050 for 1235 hours, for an average of $12,996
per flight hour. Neither of these figures approach the
$71.94 utilized by the ITRO or the "approximately $200 per
hour" cost predicted for FY-77 during a phone interview with
a member of the CNATRA staff.
When the "costs" are shown in such disproportionate
ranges, it is rather doubtful that the overall estimated
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"savings" are any more accurate. Without valid,
substantiated, and comparable costs for all the aircraft
concerned, a meaningful and worthwhile evaluation and
appraisal is precluded.
7. Common Site Training
This factor is significant to the lowering of
overall DOD costs, but it must be considered with respect to
the potential side-effects of re-locating the current
training programs of either the Army or the Navy. It must
also be considered with respect to a consolidated or
non-consolidated syllabus, proximity to other needed
training facilities, and its impact upon the overall pilot
training organization of the services concerned.
The availability of an established site, capable of
handling the training of all DOD helicopter pilots is an
important consideration, but it should not be allowed to
overwhelm the significance of the numerous other factors.
8- Rest atemen t of DOD Savings
The following table is a simplified version of the
DOD "Funding Adjustments" cost sheet included in the PY-77
budget, Appendix F modified to reflect the amortization of
the T-34C acguisition costs and elimination of the
hypothetical base release.
Note 1 indicates a loss of $1.7 million the first
year and $5,162 million for follow-on years. In effect,
forcing consolidation at Fort Rucker improves utilization of
that base; calls for the added cost of bringing TH-55's out
of storage; increases (modestly) the acguisition cost
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per-unit of T-34C aircraft for the Navy; and adds to the
number of bases at which Navy pilot training is conducted.
Restatement of DOD "Savings"
Appropriation/item FY-77 FY-78
Army, Navy_ A£M Navy
Procurement
T-34C and simulator -1.7 -1.7





Total +10.1 -10.7 +13.0 -20.338
Total DOD -.71 -7.338*
Note 1: Figures include $12.5 million annual recurring
"savings" due to re-assignment of non-instructor military
personnel. Since this re-assignment is a shift in budget
items, the outyear net is $5,162 million added cost per
year. For FY-77, discounting the claimed $2.4 million for
military personnel produces a $1.7 million first year
additional cost. Additional items in the training
operations area remain in question due to the lack of
sufficient information on the cost-base. Not included is
unanticipated cost of civilian instrument instructors for
the Array syllabus, cost of detachments in Pensacola or other
areas of shipboard training support, and non-quantifiable




K. AREAS WARRANTING FURTHER STUDY
The following areas, though not directly affecting
consolidation of UHPT, were encountered during the research
phase of this thesis and indicate a need for further study
and development:
1. Reduction of the annual loss of 2-3 million
dollars in Navy student-pilot attrition. (Appendix
E)
2. Physiological and psychological screening
devices for pre-acceptance screening of pilot
training applicants. (appendix D)
3. Development of a DOD/Government sponsored
screening and training program leading to
completion of flight training prior to
commencement of military service, with the
alternative of contractual service in the Coast
Guard, Department of Forestry, or other government
service.
4. Development and implementation of an effective
cost-accounting method common to all DOD agencies.
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The Integrated Flight Training System has proven its
worth in the reduction of student learning time and
resultant cost savings. Any change in syllabus
structure should retain the advantages of this valuable
training method. To repeat the opinion of the FAA:
"The application of outmoded instructional
procedures. .. is inexcuseable. n (7, 73) The currently
proposed consolidated syllabus does not incorporate the
most efficient and effective method of flight training,
i.e. r IFTS.
2. Of the currently available or proposed military
aircraft, the use of the T-3UC is the most
cost-effective method of incorporating the IFTS into
helicopter pilot training.
3. Although helicopter pilot training at a common site,
using common assets, might be both feasable and
advantageous, a compromise syllabus which effectively
meets the needs of each service has yet to be
developed. Such a syllabus, if developed, could be
both inefficient and unwieldy due to overtraining in
specific areas and training flow problems.
4. Consolidation of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot
Training at Fort Rucker, Alabama, merely for the sake
of increasing the utilization of Army assets is not
sufficient justification for the proposal.
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5. An independent and indisputable cost analysis should be
conducted into the costs and savings involved in
consolidation of Army and Navy helicopter pilot
training. This analysis should determine accurate cost
data using adequately documented equivalent costs
common to both services. Consideration must be given
to differences in syllabus content and their effect on
follow-on requirements. Additional consideration
should be given to the costs likely to be incurred
downstream. The long-range costs of those factors
currently treated as "non-quantifiable" should also be
considered.
6. Consolidation of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot
Training, as currently proposed, is not cost effective
and therefore not in the best interests of the




GAO CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
CONCLUSIONS
The Army and Navy have taken, or are planning, changes
in UHP training within their own service which should reduce
costs. These changes will not use DOD's resources to the
maximum efficiency. The Navy will be buying $18 million
worth of fixed-wing aircraft for its UHP training, while the
Army has hundreds of helicopters in storage which could be
used in a consolidated all-helicopter program. Further, the
Army and Navy will continue to have separate training
programs at multiple sites even though one site can
accommodate all UHP training for DOD.
The cost of the Navy UHP training program could be
reduced by requiring the Navy to discontinue fixed-wing
training in favor of all-helicopter training. This step
would permit the Navy to avoid spending money for new
fixed-wing aircraft and would make use of present DOD
helicopters.
Although recurring savings cannot be ascertained until
decisions are reached on such matters as the training
curriculum to bs used and facilities and personnel
requirements, consolidating UHP training could reduce DOD's
overall annual training cost.
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We recognize that the services* requirements in UHP
training may not be identical and differences in
requirements might preclude either of the present UHP
programs for fully satisfying the needs of all services
without some changes. However the basic requirements and
purposes of the services' program are commoD. In UHP
training, the student learns basic flying skills,
techniques, and procedures necessary to qualify as a
helicopter pilot. Advanced flying techniques and procedures
applicable to specific types of helicopters or missiions are
taught in various follow-on training programs. Therefore, a
common training program would satisfy most of the services
requirements. Truly unique requirements could be satisfied
by developing a joint program with a modular concept. For
example, if one of the services needs to emphasize certain
portions of the training or needs to satisfy a unique
requirement, it could do so by using additional modules
without significantly diminishing the potential benefits of
a joint program.
RECOMMENDATION
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense consider
directing the Navy to discontinue fixed-wind training and





PRO»S AND CON'S OF ITRO OPTIONS
A. NAVY LONG RANGE PILOT TRAINING SYSTEM <LRPTS> OPTION
Pro
(1) Requires no additional PCS/TDY costs.
j[2) Provides flight time experience for military
instructor pilots and is in consonance with newly
formulated gate system.
(3) provides maximum flexibility for each service to
manage efficiently its training resources as
requirements and funding vary.
(4) Provides parallel systems which result in
advantages of competition (innovation, quality
improvement) and provides a basis for comparative
performance evaluation.
(5) Provides helicopter training alternatives in
location, syllabus, management.
(6) Provides a total Navy and Marine training system,
at least a part of which is not subject to disruption
by civilian labor disputes.
(7) Recognizes experiences of foreign governments that
have attempted consolidation, found it less than
satisfactory, and reverted to separate service flight
training.
(8) Allows each service to enjoy the efficiencies of
including service specific training in its
undergraduate syllabus without devoting time and
resources to unnecessary training which might be
required by another service.
96

(9) Meets Secretary of Navy requirement for fixed wing
lualif ication in UHPT.q
(10) Allows for a Navy and Marine screening method to
identify pipeline selection.
(11) Meets OPNA7 requirements of 50 hours pilot
instrument time for a standard instrument rating.
(12) Meets professional development criteria of the
Department of the Navy.
(13) Provides for individual service standards for
designation,
(14) Provides for Navy shore duty billets to offset sea
tours.
(15) Syllabus meets all services* requirements for
training aviators.
(16) Provides for a possible base closure.
2. Con
(1) Does not provide for all helicopter training at a
single base.
(2) Does not provide a common syllabus for all
helicopter training.
(3) Does not relieve Congressional/GAO pressure to
consolidate.
(4) Does not provide for the most efficient use of Army
training facilities.
(5) Requires procureient of T-34C aircraft.
B. COMBINED TRAINING OPTION
1. £ro
(1) provides for all helicopter training at a single
base.
(2) Provides for a possible base closure.
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(3) Syllabus meets all services' requirements for
training aviators.
(4) Provides a more efficient use of current Army
facilities.
(5) Provides for continued use of TH-57 under existing
contract.
(6) Provides for all-turbine helo training for Navy/MC.
(7) Conforms • with current Army/AF training philosophy
of all-helo training program.
(8) Provides all services with service-unique training.
(9) Provides Navy/Marine extended screening process for
pipeline selection.
(10^ Provides Navy and Marine students with fixed wing
training prior to UHPT.
(11) Syllabus meets OPNAV requirements of 50 hours
pilot instrument time for a standard instrument rating.
(12) The helicopter portion of OHPT meets the
>rofessio
:he Navy.
pr nal development criteria of the Department of
tl
(13) Retains Navy shore duty billets to offset sea
tours.
(14) Provides a non-disruptive means of integrating,
consolidating, and coordinating existing syllabi
without serious degradation of training objectives.
(15) Provides a foundation of joint operating
experience and a perspective upon which to basejudgements relative to future consolidation of other
syllabus elements.
2. Con
(1) Additional TAD costs will be associated with
pre-flight training in the Pensacola area.
(2) Uneven inputs of students from Navy and Marine
sources create difficulties in training management.
(3) Requires procurement of T-3UC aircraft.
(4) Requires additional logistics support for locating





(1) Provides for all helicopter training at a single
bas e.
(2) Provides a common syllabus other than service
unique for all helicopter training.
(3) Reduces types and numbers of training equipment.
(4) Provides for a possible base closure.
(5) Provides for a more efficient use of current Army
resources.
(6) Syllabus meets Army and Air Force requirements for
training aviators.
2. Con
(1) Does not meet Navy requirements for fixed wing
qualification in UHPT.
(2) Does not allow for a screening method to identify
pipeline selection.
(3) OPNAV requirements of 50 hours pilot instrument
time for a standard instrument rating can be met only
at the expense of service unique training.
(4) The primary syllabus provides an inordinate
of contact time for Navy/MC flight training.
amount
(5) The TH-55 is no longer an appropriate training
platform because of its reciprocating engine and its
smaller size compared to operational aircraft.
{6) Exercise of this option could create a large excess
inventory of aircraft and simulators (37 TH-57s, 92
T-28s, and 20 2B21s> before their service life has
expired.
(7) Additional TAD costs will be associated with
pre-flight training in the Pensacola area.
(8) Does not meet professional development criteria of
the Department of the Navy.
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(9) Uneven inputs of students from Navy and Marine
sources create difficulties in training management.
(10) Does not provide for Navy shore duty billets to
offset sea tours.
(11) Requires subsequent fixed-wing training to meet
Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard career patterns.
(12) Does not provide for continued use of the TH-57
under existing contract.
Additional negative arguments would be that 1) the
TH-57 precludes the use of the integrated flight system and
2) the TH-57 is powered by a reciprocating engine, unlike





DIEECT AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS FOR
TRAINING TD THE SAME OBJECTIVES
In an effort to demonstrate the rationale for the
Navy contention that training in a mixed fixed-wing
Helicopter syllabus is inherently less expensive than
training to the same objective in helicopters alone, an
analysis of costs for training in several situations was
made. The first situation involves the acquisition of an
FAA commercial helicopter rating. The least cost method of
achieving this rating from commercial flying schools under
the two alternative methods is shown in Table I.
The data in the table show that an FAA commercial
helicopter rating can be obtained in a combination of fixed
wing and helicopters for less than half the cost of the same
rating obtained in helicopters alone. It is significant
that this evaluation obviously includes all costs accruing
to the company providing the services.
Extension of the above results to the more complex
objectives of the military pilot training systems is
difficult because the two systems are so different in both
objectives and methodology. As discussed elsewhere in this
review, the Army All-Helicopter syllabus does not meet Navy
and Marine Corps requirements. The principal reason is the
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lack of integration of the instrument and contact flying
procedures. Accordingly, in order to develop a meaningful
comparison, instrument capability becomes the index for
construction of comparable syllabi. Accordingly, Table II
shows two alternative presentations. In the first, the
instrument training capability of the present Army syllabus
is upgraded by substituting 55 hours of H-1 time for TH-55
time. This makes it roughly comparable to the Navy LHPTS
syllabus in that only 30 hours are non-instrument capable in
each syllabus (TH-55 and TH-57) . The second alternative
degrades the Navy syllabus to the approximate instrument
training capability of the present Army syllabus. The T-34B
which has only slightly better instrument training
capability than the TH-55 is used in place of the T-34C and




CIVILIAN - FAA COMMERCIAL RATING
All Helicopter 1
Private rating
Hughes 500 35 HRS 3325.00
Commercial Helo Rating
Hughes 500 115 HRS 10925.00
Fixed Wing/Helicopter 2
Private Rating
Cessna 150 35 HRS 700.00
Additional FW Hours
Cessna 150 65 HRS 1300.00
Commercial Helo Rating




NOTES: 1. Civilian Helicopter costs from HASCS.
Montgomery County Air Park, SaithersSurg, Md
2. Civilian Fixed Wing Costs From Chantilly




It will be observed that in each case the mixed
syllabus is less expensive than the all helo syllabus.
Reasonably then, a question arises concerning the apparent
greater cost of the current Navy program in comparison to
the current Army All-Helicopter syllabus. The answer is
that the two training programs were designed to meet
different objectives and, hence, are not comparable.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a given
training requirement can be met most economically if a













1970.0 T-34C 90 HRS 4056. 00
18126.0 TH-57 30 HRS 2158.00
,
- ^«» UH-1 19. HRS 8 4_59,Q0
20096.0 190 HRS 14673.00
Training Degrade
Army LRPTS (Modified)
TH-55 85 HRS 558.00
UH-1 _9U_HRS 11480.00
TOTALS 180 HRS 17060.00
T-34B 85 HRS 4469.00
0H-1 _25_HRS -1 1480.00
180 HRS 15949.00








SELECTION CRITERION FOR NAVAL AVIATION OFFICERS
In the procurement of Aviation Officers for the
Naval service, the Navy utilizes a selection and screening
process to determine the probability of successful
completion of the aviation training program an applicant
seeks. The subjects screened are applicants for either the
pilot program or the Naval Flight Officer (NFO) program, and
come from several varied sources ranging from NROTC and
Naval Academy to direct civilian inputs known as Aviation
Officer Candidates (AOC) . During the training process
students are assigned to one of three main "pipelines" which
contain the flow of jet, propeller, and helicopter
classifications of trainees. The selection process for these
three main areas is based upon the premise that the student
with the highest grades through Primary Flight Training
should be given his/her choice of the type aircraft desired
for further training, and that those with the highest grades
possess the greatest potential to complete jet training. If
quotas for that pipeline are available, the student is
awarded the pipeline chosen. A similiar process is
exercised upon the completion of Advanced Flight Training
when the Bureau of Naval Personnel assigns the type mission
and aircraft based upon overall training grade and student
preference. The following figure depicts the routes of















FIGURE 1 - GENERAL FLOW OF COMPLETIONS OF NAVY STUDENTS
When a type mission and aircraft are assigned, the
individual undergoes training in the type aircraft with a
"readiness" sguadron, receiving mission training in the
aircraft being used in the fleet.
A. CURRENT SELECTION AND PREDICTION
The selection process for Navy and Marine Corps Aviators
and Flight Officers includes the procurement and retention
of officer personnel who are physically and emotionally fit
for both military aviation and a military life. The design
of this process includes procurement, psychological testing
and an aviation physical examination.
Procurement procedures include a review of a candidate's
application forms, personal reference check, a personality
rating by an Aviation Procurement Officer, and a security
check, all of which are under the control of the Bureau of
Naval Personnel.
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has responsibility




Aviation selection practices have been standardized as
much as possible in an effort to maintain consistent results
throughout the service. k four-part "U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps Aviation Selection Test" battery covers abilities,
attitudes, interests, and personal characteristics to
provide a probability of completion of aviation training; a
standardized evaluation of all applicants; and an economical
basis for selection. The Navy and Marine Corps feel that
this test battery is the best means currently available for
determining the probability of success of an aviation
candidate before providing him/her with training.
After commencing training, a candidate's performance
level in particular areas is evaluated as a means of
expanding and refining the estimated probability of
successful completion. A computerized program for
prediction is located at Pensacola, providing a progressive
probability, adding new data to the initial selection data
as each individual reaches various stages in training. The
combined data are analyzed to provide administrative
dec is ion- ma Jeers a base upon which to evaluate a student
experiencing difficulties in subsequent phases of training.
B. AVIATION SELECTION TESTS
The Aviation Qualification Test (AQT) is the first part
of the selection process and is used as an academic screen
to filter those applicants which may not be considered good
risks to complete the academic portions of training. A
correlation of .60 is found between academic training grades
and AQT results. Failure of this test precludes further
processing of an applicant.
The Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR) is composed of three
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parts, the Spatial Apperception Test (SAT) , the Mechanical
Comprehension Test (MCT) , and the Biographical Inventory
(BI) . Each of these parts of the FAR adds a discrete factor
to the prediction of successful completion of aviation
training. A correlation of .30 is found with the FAR and a
pass/fail dichotomy in training. The two correlations given
above are, however, uncorrected for sample truncation, a
condition which is considerable with 32 percent rejection on
the basis of FAR score and seven to ten percent rejection on
the basis of the AQT.
The AQT contains 115 items, covering quantitative
ability, verbal ability, practical judgement, clerical speed
and accuracy, and direction following. It requires 60
minutes to administer.
The MCT requires 45 minutes, and contains 76 items which
measure mechanical aptitude.
The SAT is a measure of spatial orientation through a
series of diagrams depicting aircraft cues and natural
horizon as would be seen in relation to the aircraft. It is
30 items in length, requiring 10 minutes to complete.
The BI is untimed and contains 120 items. Item content
indicates evidence of early maturity, early risk-taking
behavior, informal acquisition of aerospace knowledge,
selected personal history items which relate to aviation
success, and selected items reflecting attitudes and
interests relating to aviation success. As assets increase
(Volume of applicants) and/or the demand for input
decreases, the minimum scores for each part of the selection
tests may be varied to increase the input-to-completion
ratio, but in no case may criteria be lowered below the
minimum set by BDMED. (1,634)
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C. PSYCHOLOGY OF FLIGHT
Today's Naval Aviators and the military aviators of the
other services are a select group of America's high-caliber
young men and women. Aviation personnel today are more
standardized through selection criteria, computerized in
performance requirements during training, and significantly
more aware of safety and performance requirements than in
preceeding years. The aircraft are now known as "weapons
platforms" for numerous types and sizes of highly
sophisticated "smart" bombs, rockets, missiles, and other
electronic devices. In addition to flying, the aviatior is
responsible for the operation of his "weapons system" and
the pressure for accuracy in predictions of success of the
aviator, in the training period and thereafter, is growing
with the platform's complexity and cost.
Unfortunately, the selection and prediction system of
the Navy is primarily aimed at completion of training and
not at the fit of the individual to the training received,
nor to the probability of successful performance at the
operational level.
In addition to unsuccessful performance of approximately
eight percent of the student input, a number in excess of 20
percent withdraw from training of their own volition. This
twenty (plus) percent, labeled DORs, have eluded prediction
although specific attempts have been made to identify them.
D. IDENTIFYING THE DOR
Since the early 19U0's, when most of the current selection
tests were originated, numerous updates, corrections and
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alterations have occurred. Changes have been as a result of
individual hypotheses developed to answer particular
problems being encountered, the most significant one
currently being the high DOR rate. In an effort to identify
those individuals who would later drop from training on
their own request, several studies have been conducted, with
a noticeable increase in frequency during the end of the
Vienam era and implementation of the all-volunteer-forces
concept.
The primary areas with which the reasearchers have
concentrated are in the uses of various personality tests,
determination of Need Satisfaction and Motivation,
establishment of normal and abnormal levels of anxiety,
measurement of aptitudes versus achievements, various
non-cognitive measures, and numerous attempts at
factor-analytic methods.
Beyond the completion of flight training, the current
system appears quite ineffective, (23) although several
studies have attempted to extend the prediction system into
the fleet. (24) , (25)
The factor which appears as the most glaring discrepancy
of the research effort by the Navy is the scope within which
the research groups are operating. The overall problem is
significant and broad, the method being practiced is one of
taking pot-shots at a rapidly inflating balloon.
In addition to selection, the assignment methods
utilized at the completion of primary and advanced stages of
training could be reviewed with an eye to a short-term
reward versus long-term error. The peer pressure and
self-esteem aspects of picking the jet pipeline if there are
any quotas available, and the quota control basis of
regulating the flow of students into various pipelines on a
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weekly basis, is both foolhardy and an extravagant waste of
personnel. The pipeline screening process, as it currently
exists, seems to be failing in several areas. Due to the
relatively short term available for student observation, and
by requiring everyone to learn at the same rate, it has
failed to accurately measure flying capability.
Using flight grades to identify those personnel most
likely to perform at or above some satisfactory level of
competence fails to indicate a student's motivation or
desire for a particular pipeline. For example, a student
with excellent flight grades will rarely receive his
pipeline preference if it conflicts with the "needs of the
Navy" that week. Thus the weekly quota system, while
providing rapid reaction to the varying needs of each
pipeline, may later waste ten to twenty student-months of
training when the dissatisfied student elects to DOR.
Combinations of several psychological inventories and
the confidential instructor ratings (26) may improve the
assignment problem while solving a percentage of the DOR
problem at the same time. If the psychological testing is
broad enough, on a long range basis, it may prove able to
differentiate more factors critical to individual
assignments in type missions, type aircraft, or other type
assignments the Naval Aviator is facing.
In researching the studies and hypotheses that have been
noted here and/or in the bibliography and list of references
for this Appendix, not a single, all-inclusive study of the
future direction of the Naval Aviation training program was
found. Each report and publication approaches the
periphery, but not one attempts to blanket the "system" in
breadth or over time. An overview of the problem is not
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Increase in Jet and Prop Attrition
Due to loss of Helicopter Training
Table I shows the distribution as a percent of the total
of students by primary flight grade (PFG) for a sample of
1385 recent primary stage completers. The top line of the
table shows the total population distribution while the next
three lines show the breakdown of the distribution to the
Jet, Prop and Helicopter Pipelines. It will be observed
that, while the total population is approximately normally
distributed, the screening process operates to bias the
distribution in the individual pipeline. Thus the Jet Line
is favored with a preponderance of students with high PFG,
and the Helicopter Line receives a disproportionate
percentage with low PFG.
If Helicopter training is lost, the screening process
will operate only with respect to the Jet and Prop Lines.
The Primary output shown in Table I is redistributed to the
two pipelines in the display of Table II. In constructing
the table the following assumptions were used:
a. Jet/Prop mix is in accordance with presently
projected mix for FY 76-90.
b. Jet qualifying score will have to be lowered to the
2.97-3.00 range and, therefore, student preference will
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dominate the mix at grades above 3.00. Thus, relative
Jet/Prop ratios above 3.00 will be as they are now above
3.06.
c. The screening process will operate to force the bulk
of the low grades into the Prop Pipeline.
It will be observed that the effect of these assumptions
is to retain the dominance of high PFG in the Jet Line where
attrition is so much more expensive. However the inevitable
impact of the loss of the Helicopter Pipeline is to raise
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Table III shows the distribution of attrition as a
function of PFG. As might be expected, down stream
attrition in both pipelines correlates well with PFG. That
is, attrition is higher among students with lower primary
flight grades. Table III shows, for each pipeline, the
experienced attrition for each PFG class interval and the
percent of total attrition that occurs in the class
interval. A new attrition table can be constructed for the
distribution shown in Table II by applying the experienced
class interval attrition. This is done in Table IV. For
the lower PFG class intervals where no jet pipeline
experience exists, the conservative assumption was made that
attrition would be the same as that experienced in the first
higher class interval for which experience existed. Table
IV shows the number of attrites per thousand primary
completers for each cell on the top line and the new
percentage contribution to total pipeline attrition on the
second line for each pipeline. The new weighted average
attrition for the pipeline is shown in the first colmn. It
will be noted that Jet attrition rises to 17% from 15% while
Prop attrition rises to 19.9% from 16%.
At planned production rates the increases in attrition
shown reguire an increased primary output of 38 additional
students. The direct costs of providing primary training
for these students and processing them downstream to
attrition are displayed below:
Primary Training (38 Students) $ 211,000
Jet Training To Attrition (15 Students) 730,000
Prop Training To Attrition (23 Students) 35 0, O CC
Total Cost $T73TT7TJT5U
Thus the loss of the Helicopter Pipeline would result in
increased costs due to higher attrition in the Jet and Prop
Pipelines. These costs by conservative estimate would be
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Funding Adjustments Attributable to the
Consolidation Of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training

























Other Direct Civilian Salaries
Fueling and Other Contracted Services
























a7 Included in aircraft maintenance contract.
b/ Omitted from estimated cost savings thus producing
a conservative estimate of savings.
c/ Navy planned contracts for aircraft maintenance; work
now accomplished by military/direct hire civilians.
d/ Civilian contract instructors.
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g/ Net of base operating support required for tenant
or residual operations.
f/ Includes appropriate allocation of training tail.
Net of added TAD and moving costs.




















Other Direct Civilian Salaries
Fueling and Other Contracted Services





















NoFes for FEis page are the same as the previous table
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MANPOWER ADJUSTMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF






























a/ TJoes nol include increased civilian contract
instructor personnel required (+ $1.2 million).
b/ Net of 135 officers and 17 enlisted required for
support of Fort Rucker training.




HELICOPTER TRAINING SQUADRON EIGHT COST REPORT
Flying Hoar Cost Report






Equip Flight POL Other Fit-Ops Aviation Total
A/C Code Hours Cost Fit Ops Sub-Total Maint Cost Cost
TH-57A AHYA 1235 11074 1587 12661 3389 16050
* * * Fiscal Year-To-Date * * *
Flight POL Other Fit-Ops Aviation Total
Hours Cost Fit Ops Sub-Total Maint Cost Cost
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